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Pharmaceuticals are responsible for a substantial percentage of the total cost of health care 
and continue to exceed economic growth and inflation. Generic medicines play an important 
role in limiting this expenditure, and consequently there is an international drive to implement 
pro-generic policies particularly in high income countries. One such policy is generic medicine 
reference pricing (GRP). Generic reference pricing sets a fixed maximum reimbursement 
amount for clusters of bio-equivalent drugs without placing any restrictions on the 
manufacturers’ price. 
Numerous studies have been conducted in high income countries to analyse the impact of 
generic reference pricing; however, the impact of this reference pricing in low-to-middle 
income countries (LMICs) is not well established.  
Objective 
This dissertation aims to address this lack of information in LMICs by providing empirical 
aggregated claims data on the impact of generic reference pricing on price, expenditure, 
utilisation and out-of-pocket (OOP) payments in a sector of South Africa’s private health 
insurance industry. 
Methods 
This time series intervention study of retrospective claim-level secondary data analyses the 
impact of one of several generic reference pricing models applied by various private medical 
insurance companies in South Africa. Criteria applied for the selection of referenced 
categories and sample claims data intend to maximize the data set as well as the analysis 
period, while minimizing confounders such as medical insurance member variation and 
specific managed care policies. The impact of the reference price on variables of drug price, 
drug expenditure, market share and out-of-pocket payment is measured by analysing changes 
in the originator, ‘authorised generic’ (‘clone’) and generic drugs within each cluster. (An 
‘authorised generic’ (AG) is an exact copy of the originator, approved as a brand-name drug 




Two referenced priced categories (Desloratadine and Clopidogrel) and a population of 
approximately 100,000 were identified as being eligible for inclusion. An authorised generic 
was launched for Clopidogrel but not for Desloratadine.  
The implementation of generic reference pricing appears to have had no or minimal impact 
on the price of the originator and authorised generic – at the end of the study period the price 
of the originator drugs of the two categories was 268% and 86% higher than the reference 
and the authorised generic of Clopidogrel was 69% higher than the reference price. Most often 
the reference price appeared to be based on the price of a generic drug; however once the 
reference price was set other generics tended to align at or below the reference price.  
The implementation of generic reference pricing was associated with an overall increase in 
dispensed volumes and a decrease in expenditure for both categories; both categories’ 
originator market share declined dramatically by volume (to 23% and 4%) and value (to 35% 
and 9%). For Clopidogrel the authorised generic took the majority of market share (63% by 
volume and 68% by value); the generics only gained one third of the market, despite lower 
product prices and minimal co-payments. Desloratadine generics captured 80% of the market 
by the end of the study.  
For both categories there was no notable change in the total drug expenditure paid out-of-
pocket across the study period. The percentage of drugs dispensed that had a co-payment 
decreased dramatically for Desloratadine, but were only seen to decrease marginally for 
Clopidogrel.  
Limitations 
Due to the small sample and limited reference categories analysed, the findings from this 
study are not representative of the South African private healthcare sector and cannot be 
extrapolated to South Africa.  In addition, any savings identified should take the expense of 




Despite the small sample size, the findings of this study are mostly consistent with literature 
published on the impact of GRP in high-income countries.  In addition, the findings suggest 
the negative impact that originator manufacturers’ marketing strategies have on pro-generic 
policies by targeting provider brand-loyalty and information asymmetry. This highlights the 
importance of addressing both supply and demand measures in implementing pro-generic 
policies. In particular demand measures should be actively pursued to align incentives across 
the prescriber, dispenser and consumer chain. 
Policy Implications 
To address the issue of brand-loyalty and the impact of authorised generic marketing 
strategies, it is proposed that mandatory prescribing by International Non-proprietary Names 
(INN) in private and public sectors is enforced, as proposed in the National Drug Policy of 1996. 
This should be implemented in conjunction with improved education on generic prescribing 
and active promotion of generic acceptance by prescribers and dispensers of medicine, 
patients and the community as a whole.  
vi 
Acknowledgements 
Professor Diane McIntyre of the Health Economics Unit, University of Cape Town supervised 
the development of this dissertation and its various components. She provided guidance on 
the processes, the topic, protocol and its submission, research methodology and data analysis, 
literature review, journal article, policy brief and manuscript development. She supported and 
encouraged me tirelessly throughout a rather long process of juggling other priorities with my 
studies.   
Lourens Wepener of Medscheme Holdings Pty (Ltd) assisted me with data management and 
data analysis. 
Yvette van der Westhuizen of MediKredit Integrated Healthcare Solutions assisted with data 
extraction and collation.  
Krish Pather and Thealdi Mitchell of MediKredit assisted me with information on MMAP, 
MediKredit’s generic reference pricing model as well as data extracts of product information 
and pricing. 
Alex Brownlee and Andrew Wright of Medscheme Holdings Pty (Ltd). Alex assisted with data 
analysis and Andrew enabled this dissertation by giving me study leave to get the work done. 
MediKredit Healthcare Solutions (Pty) Ltd permitted and provided access to data and relevant 
information on their generic reference pricing models. MediKredit also funded 2 years of my 
MPH studies.  
Medscheme Holdings Pty (Ltd) funded 1 year of my studies, and allowed me access to actuarial 
and statistician resources to assist me.  
vii 
 
Abbreviations and terminology  
ATC Anatomic Therapeutic Classification. This is a system of classification 
for drugs which is controlled by the World Health Organisation 
Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology (WHOCC). 
Auto-generic / Clone / 
Copy / Authorised 
generic / AG 
A 'generic' drug that is an exact copy of the originator. It is approved as 
a brand-name drug under a patent protection but marketed as a 
generic.  It is manufactured either by the originator company or in 
accordance with the originator company’s specifications1.  Typically 
these products are launched just prior to the originator product going 
off-patent in an attempt to capture market share.  
Branded/ Brand-
name/Originator product 
 A medication sold by a pharmaceutical company under a trademark-
protected name. Brand-name medications can only be produced and 
sold by the company that holds the patent for the drug. 
CMS Council for Medical Schemes, South Africa. This is a statutory body 
which regulates Medical Schemes (medical insurers) in South Africa. 
Co-payment An out-of-pocket payment that is part of the healthcare service cost 
typically paid at the point of service. 
DDD Defined Daily Dose. The World Health Organisation (WHO) defines the 
DDD as ‘the assumed average maintenance dose per day for a drug 
used for its main indication in adults’2.  
Dispensing fee This is the professional practice fee that a pharmacist or dispensing 
doctor may receive for filling prescriptions. It includes professional 
services such as patient counselling, monitoring of drug therapy, 
providing drug information to physicians and dispensing drug products. 







pricing / International 
benchmarking 
Designated service provider: a health care provider or group of 
providers selected by the medical insurer as the preferred provider or 
providers to provide to its members’ diagnosis, treatment and care in 
respect of one or more prescribed minimum benefit conditions. 
 
External reference pricing or international benchmarking is defined as 
“the practice of using the price(s) of a medicine in one or several 
countries in order to derive a benchmark or reference price for the 
                                                     
1 Federal Trade Commission, 2011.  Authorised Generic Drugs: Short-Term Effects and Long-Term Impact. 
Available from: http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/08/2011genericdrugreport.pdf 
2 World Health Organisation, 2014. ATC/DDD Index. Available from: http://www.whocc.no/atc_ddd_index/ 
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purposes of setting or negotiating the price of the product in a given 
country”3 
 
Generic drug The Food and Drug Administration (FDA, USA) defines a generic drug as 
“A drug product that is comparable to brand/reference listed drug 
product in dosage form, strength, route of administration, quality and 
performance characteristics, and intended use”. The Department of 
Health refers to a generic as an ‘interchangeable multi-source 
medicine’.  
GRP Generic Reference Pricing. This refers to a maximum reimbursement 
level for a defined cluster of drugs. Drugs within the cluster typically 
have the same active ingredient and pharmaceutical form. Generic 
reference pricing is also referred to as molecular reference pricing. 
HAI Health Action International. This is a non-profit organisation that 
represents the interests of consumers in drug policy.  
INN International Non-proprietary Names (INN). The INN is a nomenclature 
system used to identify active ingredients of medicines. The WHO 
designates a non-proprietary or generic name to pharmaceutical 
substances, which is globally recognized.   As the INN is unique and 
distinct this nomenclature enables the identification of 
pharmaceuticals and avoids confusion in prescribing4.  
LMIC Low and/or Middle Income Countries 
MediKredit MediKredit Integrated Healthcare Solutions (Pty) Ltd. This is a South 
African pharmaceutical benefit management company that processes 
claims for pharmacies, doctors and hospitals. 
‘Me-too' / Incremental 




These are drugs that are reformulations of existing drugs in dose and/or 
form or drugs with a new chemical structure for treatment of a disease 
that already exists5, and result from ‘follow-up’ research and 
development. 
MMAP Maximum Medical Aid Price, a generic reference pricing model. 
MediKredit Integrated Healthcare Solutions (“MediKredit”), a South 
African Pharmacy Benefit Management company, is the custodian of 
this model. 
MPL Medscheme Price List, a generic reference pricing model managed by 
Medscheme Holdings, a medical insurance administrator. 
                                                     
3 Leopold, C., Mantel-Teeuwisse, A.K., Seyfang, L., Vogler S., de Joncheere, K., Laing, R.L., Leufkens, H. 2012, 
“Impact of External Price Referencing on Medicine Prices – A Price Comparison Among 14 European Countries”, 
South Med Review, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 34–41 
4 World Health Organisation, 2014. International Nonproprietary Names. Available from:  
http://www.who.int/medicines/services/inn/en/ 
5 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008. Pharmaceutical Pricing Policies in a Global 
Market. Health Policy Studies. OECD. 
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NAPPI National Pharmaceutical Product Index. This is a code that is allocated 
to all medicines and surgical consumables in South Africa. For 
medicines it is unique to a product’s name, ingredient and salt, dosage 
form and strength.  
NHI National Health Insurance. 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: ‘a unique 
forum where the governments of 30 democracies work together to 
address the economic, social and environmental challenges of 
globalization’4.  
OOP payment Out-of-Pocket Payment: Fee paid by the consumer of health services 
directly to the provider at the time of delivery.  
PBM Pharmaceutical Benefit Manager. 
PMB Prescribed Minimum Benefit(s): a benefit/set of benefits for which a 
medical insurer must pay in full the diagnosis, treatment and care costs. 
Co-payments and deductibles are not permitted unless a non-DSP 
provider has been used or the patient has voluntarily claimed outside 
of the insurer’s treatment protocols and/or formulary.  
RP/IRP Reference price (pharmaceutical)/Internal reference pricing. In the 
context of this dissertation reference pricing refers to internal 
reference pricing (IRP) and not external reference pricing (international 
benchmarking). IRP refers to a maximum reimbursement level for a 
defined cluster of drugs. 
SEP Single Exit Price. This is the price, approved by the Department of 
Health, that the manufacturer or importer of a medicine sets. It 
includes any logistics fees and value-added tax but excludes any 
dispensing fee.  
TRP Therapeutic Reference Pricing. A maximum reimbursement level 
applies to a defined cluster of drugs that may be pharmacologically or 
therapeutically similar.   
TRIPS Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. TRIPS is an 
international agreement which has established intellectual property 
standards for the international trading system.  It is administered by 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO).  
VAT Value added tax. Current value in South Africa is 14% 







I have used the Harvard style of referencing for all parts of this dissertation, with the exception 
of the Journal Manuscript. Vancouver reference style is used in the manuscript in accordance 
with the Instructions for Authors of Health Policy, the peer reviewed journal that I have 
selected.  
 
I have used Refworks as a reference system. I have noted that there are some variations in 
Refworks application of citations and bibliography when compared to available guidelines to 
Harvard referencing. As Refworks is a recommended University of Cape Town reference 
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Pharmaceuticals are responsible for a substantial percentage of the total cost of health care. 
Fuelled by the characteristics of market imperfection and the relatively inelastic demand for 
medicines, the increase in pharmaceutical expenditure continues to exceed economic growth 
and inflation (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2008).  
Against this background many countries have implemented pharmaceutical pricing policies to 
control costs. These policies target different components of the price chain including the 
manufacturer, the wholesaler and the retailer’s price (Aaserud et al. 2006). Examples of such 
policies include price caps, negotiated prices, price freezes, international benchmarking (also 
referred to as external reference pricing), profit regulation, index pricing and reference pricing 
(RP) (Aaserud et al. 2006). Frequently various combinations of these policies are implemented. 
Internal reference pricing (IRP) refers to a maximum reimbursement level for a defined cluster 
of drugs. Typically a patient will pay the difference between the price of the dispensed drug 
and the reference price. Different models of internal reference pricing exist. These are largely 
defined by the criteria for inclusion within a cluster. In generic reference pricing (GRP) models, 
also referred to as molecular reference pricing, drugs within the cluster typically have the 
same active ingredient and pharmaceutical form. Therapeutic reference pricing (TRP) clusters 
may be pharmacologically or therapeutically similar.   
Internal reference pricing (as opposed to external reference pricing) is referred to as 
‘reference pricing’ in this dissertation. 
Problem statement and justification for research 
Many countries have implemented GRP models at a national or individual insurance scheme 
level. This is particularly true for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development states (OECD 2008). However, concerns have been raised on the mixed effects 
of GRP in particular on its impact on drug pricing competition, utilisation patterns, health 
outcomes, innovative drug development and equity issues related to out-of-pocket (OOP) 
payments (‘a fee paid by the consumer of health services directly to the provider at the time 
of delivery’ (World Health Organisation 2000)).  In addition GRP has been shown to result in 
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short-term cost-savings. In order to maintain savings over longer periods of time it becomes 
necessary to implement reference pricing for additional clusters of drugs (Golob, Molj & 
Podnar 2007). 
Despite these concerns, historically there are few published studies of the empirical effect of 
reference pricing (López-Casasnovas, Puig-Junoy 2000). In the past 10 years publications have 
increased in OECD countries, but in low and/or middle-income countries (LMIC) there remains 
a paucity of published research on the impact of pharmaceutical policies to increase the use 
of generics, including GRP, both at national and private insurer level ( Faden et al. 2011, Kaplan 
et al. 2012). In a meta-analysis of published literature from 2000 to 2010, Kaplan et al 
referenced only one article on generic reference pricing in LMICs. In their conclusion they 
stressed that ‘Evaluations of generic medicines policies in LMICs are urgently needed’ (Kaplan 
et al. 2012, p. 223). Most available empirical studies address the impact of reference pricing 
on product prices; studies assessing the impact of RP on utilisation and expenditure are 
frequently not as robust as price studies. In addition many studies use aggregate level rather 
than individual case/patient-level data, due to the lack of accessibility to micro-data.  
This dissertation aims to address this dearth of information by providing robust empirical data, 
based on individual case data, on the impact of GRP on price, utilisation, expenditure and OOP 
payments in South Africa’s private health insurance industry.  
The research findings will provide useful evidence to assist in developing optimal GRP policies, 
specifically in LMICs.    
The South African context 
South Africa has a fragmented, two tier healthcare system. 8.76 million people (approximately 
16% of total population) have private medical insurance (Council for Medical Schemes 2014), 
and the remaining 84% of the population use the public sector and/or private sector, the latter 
being on an out-of-pocket (OOP) basis. The privately insured market however uses 43% (R84.7 
billion) of the country’s total healthcare spend. 17% (R14 billion) of this private insurance 
healthcare expenditure is spent on medicines, excluding hospital medicines. Significant 
increases in medical insurers’ expenditure, particularly on medicines, were especially 
apparent from the mid-‘80s to mid-90’s (Council for Medical Schemes 2011).  
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effort to control medicine prices in the private sector, including limited pro-generic policies. 
The Department of Health (DoH) has indicated that the aim of the regulatory interventions is 
to “Protect the South African health system from paying distorted prices for medicines 
through the elimination of price distortions and price distorting behavior” (Department of 
Health 2010). Regulations and policies relating to medicine pricing that have been 
implemented include regulation of the price of medicines and dispensing fees, the prohibition 
of rebates, discounts and other incentive schemes offered by manufacturers to providers and 
mandatory generic substitution. Draft regulations includes international benchmarking of 
prices of medicines (external reference pricing), regulation of logistic fees that manufacturers 
pay for the distribution of medicines and pharmacoeconomic evaluation requirements for 
new chemical entity medicines and for new indications for existing medicines. In addition all 
scheduled medicine must be registered by South Africa’s Medicine Controls Council (MCC) 
prior to marketing the product in South Africa. Any ‘interchangeable multi-source medicine’ 
(generic) must prove bioequivalence to the originator to get registration approval. Further 
detail on these policies and regulations is provided in the literature review section of this 
dissertation.  
There is no national GRP system in South Africa, but GRP and TRP are applied by various 
medical insurers in the private insurance industry, sometimes simultaneously. The first GRP 
model called “Maximum Medical Aid Price” (MMAP) was implemented in 1987 by MediKredit 
Pty (Ltd). MMAP clusters include interchangeable multi-source products that have exactly the 
same active ingredient/s and salt/s combination, strength of the active ingredient/s and 
dosage form (for example tablets versus capsules) as other pharmaceutical products. Products 
are excluded from the MMAP listing if substitutability data from international sources indicate 
concerns of substitution in drugs with narrow therapeutic index in life-threatening diseases. 
MMAP categories and prices are typically updated annually but ad hoc updates are also made 
in accordance with price changes of pharmaceutical products within an existing category, the 
launch of new pharmaceutical products that prompt the creation of new categories and the 
discontinuation of pharmaceutical products and/or withdrawal of pharmaceutical products 
within an existing category requiring the deletion of the category. Prices are determined to 
allow flexibility when selecting a pharmaceutical product.  
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Subsequently multiple GRP models based on different methodologies have been 
implemented by different medical insurer administrators and pharmacy benefit managers 
(author’s own industry knowledge). The complexity of the variety and variability of GRP 
models impacts prescribers and dispensers and is thought to dilute the intended impact of the 
individual GRP models.  
Pharmaceutical marketing practices used internationally to protect the market share of 
originators by minimizing or delaying the entry and penetration of generics, are common in 
South Africa. These include the launch of ‘me-too’ products (also referred to as ‘second 
generation’, ‘follow-up’ and ‘incremental innovation’ drugs) which are reformulations of 
existing drugs resulting from follow-up research and development as well as ‘authorised 
generics’, also known as ‘clones’ and ‘auto-generics’ (Federal Trade Commission 2011). 
Authorised generics (AGs) are manufactured either by the originator company or by another 
pharmaceutical manufacturer through acquisition or joint venture. They may be launched 
prior to the originator’s patent expiry in an effort to gain the ‘first-mover advantage’ in which 
the first generic launched is able to gain substantial market share at a higher price than that 
of later generics (López-Casasnovas, Puig-Junoy 2000). 
Literature review 
Definitions 
Reference pricing is a mechanism used to control pharmaceutical expenditure. External 
reference pricing refers “the practice of using the price(s) of a medicine in one or several 
countries in order to derive a benchmark or reference price for the purposes of setting or 
negotiating the price of the product in a given country” (Leopold et al, 2012). Internal 
reference pricing is a method of reimbursement. The maximum price that a third party payer 
will reimburse a specific drug is defined by its internal reference price for that drug’s cluster. 
Typically an OOP payment equivalent to the difference between the dispensed medication 
and the reference price is due by the consumer if the price of the dispensed drug is higher 
than the reference price (Miraldo 2009, Galizzi, Ghislandi & Miraldo 2011). This OOP payment 
is often referred to as cost-sharing (Aaserud et al. 2006). 
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The equivalence criteria of the cluster determine the type of internal reference pricing. Three 
basic types of clustering are defined based on chemical, pharmacological or therapeutic 
equivalence. In GRP chemical equivalence criteria are applied. Included products typically 
have the same active ingredient, strength and dosage form as an off-patent originator drug 
and are generally considered interchangeable (Aaserud et al. 2006, Galizzi, Ghislandi & 
Miraldo 2011). Therapeutic reference pricing (TRP) may include clusters of drugs that are 
chemically different but pharmacologically similar with similar or identical indications; or the 
clusters can be therapeutically similar and include all drugs to treat a specific condition 
(Aaserud et al. 2006, Galizzi, Ghislandi & Miraldo 2011). Reference pricing is often applied in 
combination with other policies aimed to control pharmaceutical expenditure such as price 
capping, controlling pharmacists’ margins and mandatory generic substitution. 
Objectives of reference pricing 
The ultimate objective of reference pricing is control of pharmaceutical expenditure with no 
associated negative health outcomes (López-Casasnovas, Puig-Junoy 2000) and no 
discriminatory effects (Miraldo 2009). Its effectiveness depends on its ability to influence both 
the supply- and demand-side of pharmaceuticals. Demand control aims to limit the quantity 
of medicine dispensed. Supply is controlled by creating price competition around the 
reference price resulting in an attempt to “induce price responses from the pharmaceutical 
firms” (Brekke, Konigbauer & Straume 2007) to ensure that market share is not lost (López-
Casasnovas, Puig-Junoy 2000, Aaserud et al. 2006). The success of reference pricing is 
influenced by multiple factors. These are detailed in the substantive literature review section 
of the dissertation.      
International status of generic reference pricing 
GRP is a common pharmaceutical policy in many countries. In Europe the majority of countries 
apply some form of officially set reference pricing. Most use chemical equivalence as the 
criteria for reference pricing, but some countries apply varying combinations of TRP and GRP 
(Puig-Junoy 2010).  LMICs mostly apply national generic substitution policies, but few of these 
countries currently apply GRP. Where it is applied, there is very little literature available on its 
effects. As indicated above there are several models of GRP that are applied in South Africa’s 
private healthcare sector. 
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Across all countries the RP models differ considerably in terms of equivalence criteria and 
price calculation.  
The effects of generic reference pricing 
The jury is still out on the long-term effectiveness and clinical outcomes of GRP. This 
speculation is fuelled by the lack of available long-term data (Golob, Molj & Podnar 2007). 
Effect on product price 
Theoretical studies predict that with the implementation of RP, drugs that are priced higher 
than the reference price will decrease in price, and the quantum of this decrease depends on 
the design of the RP model, the number of drugs in a cluster, consumer price sensitivity and 
consumer perception of the substitutability of generics for brand-name drugs. In addition 
theory suggests that the price of non-referenced therapeutic alternatives may increase 
(Brekke, Holmas & Straume 2011). 
Several empirical studies were found to support these theoretical predictions (Puig-Junoy 
2010, Galizzi, Ghislandi & Miraldo 2011). Puig-Junoy reported that price decrease often 
occurred rapidly after GRP implementation, but these decreases were however asymmetrical 
(Puig-Junoy 2010). A Slovenian study however partially supported the ‘generic paradox’ 
(López-Casasnovas, Puig-Junoy 2000) theory as the prices of several original products did not 
decrease with the launch of generic products and the implementation of reference pricing 
(Golob, Molj & Podnar 2007). 
The decrease in price due to GRP is generally much smaller than that of TRP models, which 
supports theoretical predictions (Galizzi, Ghislandi & Miraldo 2011). In addition, price drops 
have been positively correlated with the number of generic categories (Puig-Junoy 2010).  
A study by the European Commission (European Commission 2009) showed that price 
reductions were greater when GRP is combined with mandatory generic substitution and 
when references prices are regularly revised. 
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Effect on expenditure and utilisation 
The introduction of RP (GRP and TRP) is predicted to impact the utilisation and market share 
of originator and generic drugs (Miraldo 2009). Generic market share increases significantly if 
originator products do not drop their prices to RP levels (Ghislandi, Krulichova & Garattini 
2005, Golob, Molj & Podnar 2007, Galizzi, Ghislandi & Miraldo 2011). In addition empirical 
studies in multiple countries have shown a significant reduction in total expenditure. This 
decrease is reported to be most significant in the short-term (Simoens et al. 2005, Ghislandi, 
Krulichova & Garattini 2005, Puig-Junoy 2007).  
Impact on out-of-pocket (OOP) payments 
OOP payments resulting from cost-sharing policies have been shown to reduce demand 
(Fiorio, Siciliani 2010).  However, providers frequently determine demand. As such a 
prescriber’s reluctance to use generics together with information asymmetry may result in 
increased GRP OOP payments. This may reduce equity in healthcare as cost-shifting could be 
directed to individuals who may not be able to cost-share (Mossialos, Mrazek & Walley 2004). 
Aim and objectives 
The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of generic medicine reference pricing and 
thereby contribute to generic medicine pharmaceutical pricing policies and their 
implementation, particularly in LMICs.  
The specific objective is to analyse the impact of the implementation of new generic reference 
pricing categories in part of the South African private sector on: 
 The price of drugs subject to GRP; 
 The expenditure and utilisation of drugs subject to GRP; 
 Market share dynamics; 
 Patient out-of-pocket (OOP) payments. 
This study does not include consideration of therapeutic reference pricing (TRP), the effect of 
GRP on drugs not subject to GRP, the impact on pharmaceutical innovation and health 
A-10 
 
outcomes, and the impact of GRP on overall healthcare utilisation, i.e. hospitalization, doctor 
and overall medicine expenditure.  
Methodology 
Study design and measurements 
This is a quasi-experimental study. The study design is an analysis of a natural experiment. It 
is an intervention study using retrospective patient-level (not aggregated) secondary data 
obtained through records review.       
Sampling strategy 
MediKredit’s ‘Maximum Medical Aid Price’ (MMAP) model is the GRP model that is evaluated 
as an intervention. MMAP has been selected for two reasons: as the first GRP model in South 
Africa it has been the industry standard since 1987, and, as the author worked for MediKredit 
at the time of initiating this research, access to the data was facilitated.  
MMAP categories were selected based on the following selection criteria: (i) categories should 
have comparatively high volumes to ensure that the most significant drug categories based 
on market share are reviewed; (ii) categories should have been newly implemented between 
April 2008 and July 2009, for the following reasons: 
 to minimize confounding that would occur due to the implementation of mandatory 
generic substitution in 2003 and medicine price regulation (Single Exit Price - SEP) in 2004; 
and 
 because data prior to 2008 is not available;  
 to enable a post-implementation analysis  period of at least 4 years; and 
 to maximize the sample size.   
The first step was to identify eligible MMAP categories, in accordance with criteria defined 
above. A list of all MMAP categories that were implemented between 1 April 2008 and 31 July 
2009 was obtained from the MediKredit database. Exclusion criteria included the following: 
 Categories implemented prior to 1 April 2008 due to issues of data availability.  
A-11
 Categories implemented after 31 July 2009 were also excluded to ensure that the MMAP
category had been effective for at least 3 years and to maximize the data set.
 Any category that was withdrawn either temporarily or permanently during this period
 Any category to which therapeutic reference pricing applied, as the TRP is in some cases
lower than the GRP and will act as a confounder.
Next, the list of MMAP categories identified were analysed against the claims database to 
establish which categories had the greatest volumes.  A list of all products per identified 
MMAP category was then requested from MediKredit, together with a flag indicating whether 
each product is an original, generic or AG. MediKredit, as the custodian of the National 
Pharmaceutical Product Index (NAPPI) codes, produces and distributes a product file 
throughout the industry. This file is updated daily with new products and SEP changes that 
have been approved by the Department of Health.  
The third step was to obtain the price history for each MMAP category as well as for each drug 
over the defined period. Data required for each MMAP category is detailed in Appendix A in 
Part E. 
The fourth step in the sampling strategy was to identify eligible medical insurers that applied 
MMAP consistently over the analysis period. In an effort to minimise confounders, insurers 
were excluded if the following applied: 
 a customised variation of GRP was applied. In the MediKredit environment some insurers
opted to customise the reference price and/or the frequency of review;
 membership varied by more than 20% over the study period;
 closed formularies were applied which limited access to equivalent drugs in the GRP
category;
 benefit exclusions for some or all of the identified MMAP categories applied.
Finally the claims data to be analysed was extracted. In addition to identifying only those 
claims that are impacted by the sample MMAP categories and corresponding drugs, the 
following inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied: 
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 Include claims with a processing date from 4 months prior to the applicable MMAP 
category implementation to at least 4 years after MMAP category implementation to 
allow for appropriate periods for the  before and after analyses. Where claims data is 
available for longer than 4 years this should be included. 
 Include a medical insurer’s data (non-identifiable) only if MMAP was applied throughout 
the period of analysis and the medical insurer’s membership did not vary by more than 
20% over the period of analysis. This criterion is necessary as any major change in 
membership numbers and associated change in member profile could introduce 
confounding. 
 Include approved claims only (not rejected or reversed claims). 
Pricing data should exclude dispensing fees as these may vary across schemes and providers 
and will introduce an element of confounding. 
Characteristics of the study population 
The sample claims data analysed was for patients of any age that were members of private 
health insurers that processed all of their medicine claims through MediKredit.  
Instruments 
MediKredit’s data warehouse was used to obtain claims data for analysis. Claims data was 
requested for products that are specific to the identified sample of GRP categories, based on 
defined data entry criteria. Data did not include any patient-identifiable indicators such as 
name, medical insurance membership number or date of birth. The claims data did not include 
any provider, medical insurer and/or medical administrator-identifiable indicators. The data 
fields required per claim are listed in Appendix B in Part E. 
Outcomes 
The impact of the implementation of each of the identified MMAP categories has been 
measured for several variables. In each case the impact of MMAP on the sample is measured 
by analyzing changes to the originator, AG (where applicable), generics and overall MMAP 
category (across all drugs in cluster).  
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The changes in the variables are measured from one time interval to another. The time 
intervals are referred to as ‘periods’.  These ‘periods’ are the 4 months prior to the 
implementation of MMAP (MMAP launch date), the time interval after MMAP launch, and the 
periods between subsequent MMAP price changes. 
The first variable is the impact of GRP on the price of products in the reference pricing cluster. 
The second and third variables are drug expenditure and quantity dispensed. The fourth and 
fifth variables are the percentage of the market share, based on both volume and expenditure.  
The final variables relate to OOP payments. These variables determine whether MMAP has 
achieved its objective of encouraging a switch to lower-cost generics in order to reduce OOP 
payments. This is determined by analysing whether there have been changes in the volumes, 
expenditure and quantum of OOP payments per referenced category. The percentage of total 
dispensed volumes that generates an OOP payment, the percentage of total drug expenditure 
that was paid out-of-pocket and the quantum of the OOP payment (where an OOP payment 
applies) are measured.  
Reliability and validity of measurements/data 
The accuracy of MediKredit’s medicine product file is ensured through a rigorous process: new 
medicines, and/or product prices and product terminations are only updated once 
communicated by the DoH. All changes to the product file are then validated by a Quality 
Control department. Indicators of the product file such as the acute, chronic and 
acute/chronic indicators and generic/original flags are assigned based on a set of pre-defined 
rules to ensure accuracy.  
The reliability and validity of MediKredit’s claims data is also ensured through a rigorous 
process, necessitated by the fact that it is used for financial reimbursement. Basic data 
validation checks are done such as member details, provider and drug code checks; the risk of 
provider technical error is reduced through the use of validation checks e.g. an inappropriate 
quantity on a claim due to provider ‘finger trouble’ when submitting the claim will be rejected 
based on excessive quantity controls. Most claims are submitted in an on-line real-time 
environment so providers are immediately notified of errors and can resubmit the claim 
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immediately. All product prices are checked against an industry price file, which is in line with 
the DoH SEP file, and are marked down where prices higher than SEP are submitted.  
Analysis 
Data management 
A list of all products falling into the sample was provided by MediKredit, together with relevant 
fields including a flag indicating whether a product is an original, generic or AG. The drug 
manufacturer was contacted to confirm AG products. See Appendix C in Part E for detail.    
Defined Daily Dose (DDD) values per ATC were obtained from the WHO Collaborating Centre 
for Drug Statistics Methodology ATC/DDD Index website (World Health Organisation 2014). 
DDD is defined as ‘the assumed average maintenance dose per day for a drug used for its main 
indication in adults (World Health Organisation 2014)’. Each MMAP category included in the 
sample was allocated a DDD. At a claim level the claims data was converted to DDD and cost 
data converted to cost per DDD. 
Where a product’s pack size was different to that of the MMAP category, then the price for 
the product was calculated based on the MMAP pack size. E.g. If the MMAP pack size is 30, 
but the products pack size and associated price is 28, then the product’s price will be 
calculated based on a pack size of 30.  
Monetary figures are in nominal terms and have not been adjusted for inflation.  
As the implementation dates and subsequent price changes of the different reference 
categories vary, it was necessary to convert the calendar dates to a common denominator. As 
such the overall length of the study for each reference category was divided into individual 
time intervals, referred to as ‘periods’ in the study. The first period is the 4 months preceding 
the implementation of that category’s MMAP, and is referred to as P00. The subsequent 
periods are the time intervals between each MMAP price change for that category. The period 
that follows MMAP launch is P01. P02 follows the next change in MMAP price, etc. Within 
each period the reference price remains fixed but the price of individual drugs within each 
cluster may change, potentially in response to the MMAP price change. As the total study 
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duration of each reference category varies and the number of MMAP price changes vary, the 
number of ‘periods’ per referenced category may differ.  
The time interval methodology is illustrated below: 
 
 All claims data was then time-adjusted based on the date of implementation of the MMAP 
category. Each claim was allocated to a specific period in accordance with the MMAP price 
changes and the date of the claim.   
The data for the generic drugs were averaged for each outcome measure to allow a 
comparison to the originator and AG. For price, a minimum and maximum value was allocated.  
As the duration of each time period differs, it was also required to convert the expenditure 
and dispensed volumes per time period to a daily quantity to ensure that a common 
denominator of comparison is used i.e. Expenditure per day and number of DDDs per day. 
Data analysis 
The impact of MMAP on each cluster’s product prices is analysed by comparing the changes 
in price of the originator, AG and generics (average, minimum and maximum price) relative to 
the changes in MMAP price over each allocated ‘period’ and across the full study period. 
Expenditure is measured by analyzing the average expenditure per day, and the average 
expenditure per DDD. Drug expenditure is reported ‘per day’ to ensure a comparable 
denominator as the period intervals between MMAP price changes are not consistent. 
Expenditure per day is a function of price and utilisation, whereas expenditure per DDD takes 
into account the variation in product price, while controlling for volume changes.  
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Dispensed quantity is measured by calculating the number of DDDs dispensed per day. Market 
share is analysed by volume and value. The change in the dispensed DDDs as a % of total 
expenditure and as a % of total volume is analysed. 
Changes in expenditure, quantities and market share are quantified for the originator, AG and 
average generic and compared from one ‘period’ to another as well as across the full study 
period.   
Analysis of OOP payments includes 3 variables:  
 The percentage of total dispensed volumes that generate an OOP payment is measured 
as the number of DDDs with an OOP payment as a % of total DDDs, 
 The percentage of total drug expenditure that was paid out-of-pocket  is measured as the 
OOP expenditure as % Total Expenditure 
 The quantum of the OOP payment is measured as the OOP value per DDD, where an OOP 
payment applies. 
All of the above results are documented in tabular format for each variable per allocated 
‘period’. In addition the results are displayed as time-series graphs to depict changes for each 
of the variables. 
Ethics and communication 
Ethics 
As this research is a retrospective analysis of claims processed for billing purposes and does 
not involve the use of any identifiable or potentially identifiable patient-, provider-, or medical 
insurance-specific data it can be considered as being of low ethical risk. In addition data will 
not be stored for future analysis. However, there are some ethical considerations that need 
to be taken into account. 
Permission to supply and use the product file and claims data was obtained from MediKredit 
Integrated Healthcare Solutions. As no claims data provided by MediKredit is identifiable for 
patients, providers or insurers and data is presented at an aggregated level, consent from 
these parties is not required.   
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Before proceeding with the study ethical approval was obtained from the Health Sciences 
Research Ethics Committee, University of Cape Town (See Appendix D in Part E).  
Stakeholders 
The primary stakeholder in this study is MediKredit. Other stakeholders are the 
pharmaceutical companies (originator and generic), medical insurers & their members, 
medical insurance administrators, managed care organisations and pharmacy benefit 
managers, particularly companies that are custodians of GRP models.  
Government and affiliated stakeholders include the Department of Health, Medicines Control 
Council, Health Professionals Council of South Africa, South African Pharmacy Council and the 
Council for Medical Schemes. 
Industry body stakeholders include the Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa, South African 
Medical Association (SAMA), Innovative Medicines of South Africa (IMSA) and the National 
Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers. In addition the World Health Organisation and 
Health Action International, specifically the WHO-HAI Project on Medicine Pricing and 
Availability, are relevant stakeholders. 
Reporting 
The primary stakeholders detailed above will be informed of all of the findings of the study. 
The researcher recognizes her ethical responsibility to use the findings generated in this study 
to act accordingly. The findings will also be written up in a publicly accessible format, as it is 
the researcher’s specific intention to publish this study, especially considering the lack of 
empirical GRP data in LMICs.  
A policy brief that includes the research findings is included as part of the dissertation. The 
researcher will attempt to publish this brief and distribute it to relevant stakeholders, 





MediKredit data is backed up on a daily basis hence the risk of losing this data is minimal. GRP 
model categories and pricing history data was backed up on a personal external hard drive. 
The data is captured and stored electronically in a password protected file.  
Risks 
As there has been no engagement with patients or medical insurers no physical, psychological, 
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Part B:  





This literature review aims to provide an introduction to generic medicines, highlighting the 
cost advantage of increased generic utilisation. An overview is provided of various pro-generic 
policies, including generic reference pricing (also referred to as molecular reference pricing), 
illustrating how their effectiveness varies based on the complex and variable combinations 
that are implemented.  Factors impacting generic market penetration are detailed, with 
specific reference to the ‘tool-box’ of marketing strategies that are used to promote and 
restrict the use of generic medicines. 
As this dissertation focuses on the impact of generic reference pricing in the private 
healthcare sector in South Africa, particular reference is made to pro-generic and other 
pharmaceutical policies in this country.  
Finally, I focus on the different types of medicine reference pricing systems, providing an 
overview of different models of reference pricing and their various applications 
internationally.  In keeping with the objective of my dissertation, key findings from studies 
that investigate the impact of generic reference pricing (GRP) is provided, including the 
impact on product price, drug utilisation and market share, overall expenditure and out-of-
pocket payments. Although my investigation does not cover the health outcomes impact of 
generic reference pricing, reference is made to outcomes where data is available. 
Search strategy and selection criteria 
I searched for publications between 1 January 2000 and 30 June 2013 in English. A full text 
search was conducted. The following databases were searched:  EBSCOHOST (Cumulative 
Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature (CINAHL), EconLit and Medline); Pubmed; Gale 
Cengage, Cochrane Library and Google scholar. I assumed that any rigorous studies would 
most likely be published, and hence limited my search on grey literature to the following 
websites: WHO/HAI, European Commission and OECD. Where country-specific information, 
legislative or industry data was required, I searched specific websites, including (but not 
limited to) the Council for Medical Schemes (South Africa), Department of Health (South 
Africa), Department of Trade and Industry, European Generic Medicines Association, Federal 
Trade Commission, Mediscor and Intercontinental Marketing Services (IMS).  
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Search terms used were (reference pric* or index pric*) AND (generic or multisource or multi-
source or interchangeable) AND (drug or medicine or pharmaceutical). See Figure 1 for an 
overview of the search strategy and results. 
The search strategies intended to capture high-income countries (e.g., United States, Europe, 
Canada, New Zealand, Australia etc.) and low and middle income countries (LMIC).  
Figure 1: Search strategy algorithm 
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Generic medicines are described by the World Health Organisation (WHO) as being 
pharmaceutical products which are ‘intended to be interchangeable with an innovator 
product’, ‘manufactured without a licence from the innovator company’, and ‘marketed after 
the expiry date of the patent or other exclusive rights.’ (World Health Organisation 2014b). 
The underlying principle of generic medicines is that they should demonstrate bioequivalence 
to a reference drug which is usually the originator. Generic drugs may be referred to as 
unbranded, off-patent, or multi-sourced drugs (Mossialos, Mrazek & Walley 2004).  
‘Authorised generics’, ‘clones’ or ‘co-marketed copies’ (referred to as AGs in this dissertation) 
are often referred to as generics; however although they have the same active ingredient, 
they are marketed under the originator’s license under a different name (Dylst, Vulto & 
Simoens 2011).  
The advantage of generic medicines is that they do not require the same research and 
development as originator drugs. As such there is a price advantage.   Intercontinental 
Marketing Services (IMS) has estimated in their ‘Responsible use of Medicines’ report that 
between 19 and 40 billion US dollars could be saved worldwide through increased use of safe, 
low-cost generics (Intercontinental Marketing Services 2012).  The price advantage of generic 
medicines is also evident in LMIC countries. A 2010 WHO paper reports that price surveys 
conducted across a basket of medicine purchased in the private sector in 17 LMICs showed 
that use of the lowest cost generic instead of the originator drug could achieve a cost saving 
of more than 50% in 15 of the 17 countries surveyed (an average of 9% to 89%) (Cameron, 
Laing 2010). 
Although there is a worldwide trend towards increasing generic utilisation (Intercontinental 
Marketing Services 2012), the market share of generic medication varies considerably across 
different countries. This is evidenced by a 2006 study which showed that the market share in 
Europe varied from less than 10% (Ireland, Greece and Finland) to almost 80% (Latvia and 
Poland). 80% is considered to be the maximum expected rate of generic prescribing (Dunne 
et al. 2013).  In South Africa utilisation of generic medication is increasing, as reported by 
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Mediscor (Bester, Badenhorst 2012). Their report on a sector of private healthcare indicates 
an increase in generic medicine utilisation from 50.0% in 2010 to 53.4% in 2012. 
Of interest is why there is such variability in the generic market share. There are multiple 
influencing factors, many of which fall under the classification of ‘pro-generic’ policies. These 
are detailed below. 
Pro-generic pharmaceutical policies  
Economics of the pharmaceutical market do not adhere to standard economic principles. 
Intellectual property rights (patent protection), third-party payments, asymmetrical 
information and low price elasticity distort the market. Consequently policy measures, to 
ensure efficient dispensing combined with controlled expenditure, have been implemented 
to different degrees across many countries.  Many of these policies encourage generic 
medicine utilisation, as generic drugs are considered to have a price advantage.  
A range of pro-generic policies is used to attempt to control healthcare expenditure. They 
include demand and supply-side policies that aim to encourage generic entry and generic 
competition (Hawkins 2011). Typically supply-side policies are easier and hence more readily 
implemented (Kanavos, Costa-Font & Seeley 2008).  
The various pro-generic policy options are detailed in Table 1. 




Table 1: Generic pharmaceutical policies 
Supply-side policies 
Pricing and 
reimbursement policies                                           
Reference pricing   
Price caps and controls 
Price controls  
Regulatory and IP policies Fast-track approval 
Bolar provision  
TRIPS patent flexibilities - Compulsory licensing 







Promoting generic prescribing: Compulsory generic prescribing or 
Prescribing by generic name. 
Computerized support: on-line price and prescribing/dispensing 
information 
Prescribing monitoring and audit  
Pharmacy-directed policies 
Financial Pharmacy dispensing mark-ups where incentive is increased profitability 
for lower cost items (generics) e.g. Regressive margins  
Keep portion of discounts for dispensing cheaper products 
Negotiated income targets  
Non-financial Promotion of generic substitution 
Compulsory generic substitution 
Computerized support: on-line price and prescribing/dispensing 
information 
 Prescribing monitoring and audit  
Patient-directed policies 
Financial Reference-pricing  
Patient cost-sharing - differential or tiered co-payments 
Non-financial Patient education to increase awareness of generics, costs and co-
payments 
Adapted from Kavanos et al., 2008. Competition in off-patent drug markets: Issues, regulation and evidence, 
Economic Policy, July 2008 
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Supply side policies 
These include strategies to increase the entry of generics into the market by influencing the 
reimbursement of medicines, the market price of medicines and/or the regulation of market 
authorisation.  
Internal reference pricing is a system in which the level of coverage is defined - a fixed 
maximum reimbursement amount is set for clusters of bio-equivalent or therapeutically 
comparable drugs, but no restrictions are enforced on the manufacturers’ price (Aaserud et 
al. 2006, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2008).  Internal 
reference pricing is described in detail later in this review.  
Market prices may be influenced through price caps as applied in France where the price of 
generics must be 30% less than originator; the UK applies a maximum price scheme for select 
generic medicines to address supply chain issues. This however has its problems as the 
maximum price is set too high in some cases as it does not accommodate or promote 
competition on price (Kanavos, Costa-Font & Seeley 2008).  
Although regulatory restriction of market authorization is often seen to hinder generic entry, 
certain provisions may increase generic entry. These include fast-tracking of regulatory 
approval of generic medication. Other pro-generic regulatory policies include the Bolar 
provision which allows generic companies to complete regulatory requirements including 
bioequivalence studies before an originator’s patent has expired (Kanavos, Costa-Font & 
Seeley 2008) and compulsory licensing which allows a third party to produce the patented 
product or process without the consent of the patent owner. First-mover advantage 
encourages the launch of generic drugs by allowing a market exclusivity period (Kanavos, 
Costa-Font & Seeley 2008). An example is the US Hatch-Waxman legislation through which 
first-to-market generics get a 6-month exclusivity period (Kaplan et al. 2012).  
Demand-side policies 
These include prescribing and dispensing policies. They may be financial or non-financial 
incentives and may be doctor-, pharmacist- or patient-driven. Incentives to prescribe and 
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dispense generics are typically required as prescribers are more likely to use an originator 
product. 
 Physicians largely drive the demand for medicines through prescribing and education of
patients. Influencing their prescribing habits and education of patients can impact generic
utilisation and cost.
o Financial physician incentives may include budgets with penalties or rewards to
incentivise doctors to control costs. These have been successful in increasing generic
market shares in Spain (Costa-Fonta, Puig-Junoy 2004, von der Schulenburg, 
Vandoros & Kanavos 2011). However this is only successful if budgets are fixed with 
clear, enforceable guidelines and rules. Modest increase in generic prescribing and 
achievement of targeted savings has been seen in the UK’s former general 
practitioner fundholding budgets (Kanavos, Costa-Font & Seeley 2008). The concern 
with budgets is both financial and ethical, as there is a risk of quality issues if the 
financial incentive is too great. 
o Non-financial physician incentives aim to promote or force generic prescribing/
treatment. Prescribing by International Non-proprietary Name (INN) or generic name
is seen to successfully increase generic utilisation. In the UK 83% of all prescriptions 
in 2009 and 2010 were generics, the key driver being the impact of government 
policy which promotes prescribing by INN in medical training and ongoing practice 
(Dunne et al. 2013). INN prescribing was similarly phased in from 2001 in Spain. This 
has been well accepted, impacting 35% of Andalusian pharmaceutical spending with 
a net effect of reducing the average cost per script to 1% below the Spanish average 
(Costa-Fonta, Puig-Junoy 2004). Computerized support which provides on-line price 
and prescribing/dispensing information and prescribing monitoring (von der 
Schulenburg, Vandoros & Kanavos 2011) and audit (Kanavos, Costa-Font & Seeley 
2008) may also improve generic prescribing. 
 Pharmacists have a role in dispensing generic medication and educating consumers.
o Financial pharmacy incentives include dispensing mark-ups which promote increased
profitability for lower cost items (generics). These may be progressive margins such
as flat fee per prescription (Kanavos, Costa-Font & Seeley 2008) or regressive margins 
where a higher percentage is paid on lower cost items. Most EU countries have 
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implemented this policy. In Belgium, regulations ensure that profits on generics 
equal profits on originator drugs in absolute terms (Simoens et al. 2005). Other pro-
generic financial incentives include negotiated income targets for pharmacists 
(Kanavos, Costa-Font & Seeley 2008) and claw-backs. Claw-back policies are applied 
when manufacturers or wholesalers provide covert discounts to pharmacies. A 
healthcare insurer claws back a portion of this discount (Kanavos, Costa-Font & 
Seeley 2008). 
o Non-financial incentives including generic substitution policies, which may 
encourage/promote or oblige/enforce pharmacies to substitute originator products 
with generics, are successful in increasing generic utilisation (von der Schulenburg, 
Vandoros & Kanavos 2011). Generic substitution policies are implemented in many 
countries, including LMIC such as South Africa, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, 
Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay.  However there are no LMIC studies to 
support the effectiveness of this policy in these countries (Faden et al. 2011).  As with 
doctors, computerized support and prescribing monitoring and audit have also been 
shown to improve generic prescribing. 
 Patient-directed policies may also impact generic utilisation 
o Financial policies include internal reference-pricing, where the consumer pays a 
surcharge or co-payment if the dispensed medication is more expensive than the 
reference price.  This co-payment can however be avoided if a product at or below 
the reference price is dispensed. Patient cost-sharing shifts some of the financial 
responsibility onto the patient in an effort to encourage use of cheaper generics. This 
cost-sharing may be in the form of tiered or differential co-payments (a generic drug 
may have a lower percentage co-payment compared to a branded drug). Non-tiered 
co-payments such as co-insurance (some consumers may be exempt e.g. France and 
Spain), a fixed or flat-rate fee per prescription (Mossialos, Mrazek & Walley 2004, 
Austvoll‐Dahlgren et al. 2008) do not however encourage generic use as a fixed 
amount is paid irrespective of the drug type (Kanavos, Costa-Font & Seeley 2008). 
o Non-financial policies include patient education to increase awareness of generics, 
costs and co-payments. 
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In practice pro-generic policies vary in their effectiveness due to the complex combinations 
that are implemented with different degrees of vigour as well as efforts to address barriers 
to implementation of these policies (Kanavos, Costa-Font & Seeley 2008). Common to all pro-
generic policy implementation is poor monitoring to evaluate their effectiveness and 
consequently the appropriate mix that collectively promotes generic competition, 
encourages generic market entry and penetration and reduces overall healthcare expenditure 
is not clearly understood.  
Determinants and Impact of Generic Market Entry and Penetration 
Entry of a generic to a market depends on expected profits (Moreno-Torres, Puig-Junoy & 
Borrell 2009), which are determined by the extent of price regulation and price competition, 
and related barriers to entry. Price regulation may have the unintended consequence of 
prices being set higher due to concerns that low prices will be difficult to increase at a later 
stage. In the US for example where medicine prices are not regulated and price competition 
is significant, generic prices are seen to decrease substantially over time and have been seen 
to gain market sales of 50% within the first year of launching (Kanavos, Costa-Font & Seeley 
2008). Kavanos et al report that the average generic launch price in the US was 25% less than 
the originator, and decreased to 20% of the initial average generic price (Kanavos, Costa-Font 
& Seeley 2008). However the impact of generic entry on the originator price is not as clear, 
and in certain cases appears to be independent of generic competition. This is often 
attributed to demand-side brand loyalty. Some studies have demonstrated the ‘generic 
paradox’ effect in which originator prices increase with the launch of a generic (von der 
Schulenburg, Vandoros & Kanavos 2011); whereas other studies report that originator prices 
don’t decrease but their inflationary increase slows down (Kanavos, Costa-Font & Seeley 
2008, von der Schulenburg, Vandoros & Kanavos 2011).  However, where other policies such 
as reference pricing co-exist, generic entry does appear to have a competitive effect on the 
originator price (Kanavos, Costa-Font & Seeley 2008). 
Other barriers to entry and penetration of generics include first mover advantages, non-
transparent discounting and other demand-side incentives as well as originator drug 
marketing strategies (Kanavos, Costa-Font & Seeley 2008). These are detailed under the 
‘marketing strategy’ section below. 
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Generic market entry has been positively associated with the potential market size, which 
relates to anticipated profits and the number of generic companies, the age of the market 
and the number of branded products (copy or licensed) (Moreno-Torres, Puig-Junoy & Borrell 
2009). The impact of reference pricing on generic entry is detailed later in this literature 
review.  
Several studies have indicated that issues which impact generic penetration are patent 
protection policies and the extent of price regulation (Magazzini, Pammolli & Riccaboni 2004). 
Policies that encourage price competition have been seen to be effective in increasing generic 
penetration (e.g. USA), whereas environments in which prices are highly regulated appear to 
limit generic diffusion (e.g. Spain: 2006 IMS data indicates a market share for generics 14.6% 
in volume, and 7.9% in value) (Magazzini, Pammolli & Riccaboni 2004, Moreno-Torres, Puig-
Junoy & Borrell 2009).   




Table 2: Impact of expiry of originator brand patent and generic entry 
Variable Effect Comment 




Effect holds if there is no regulation 
Price of generic drug Declines Extent of decline is unclear and may depend on 
regulation 
Volume or market 
share of originator 
brand 
Declines Decline is significant and may at times reach zero 
Volume or market 
share of generic drug 
Increases Takes up most of the originator market share, but 
may not increase significantly due to potential 
switch effects 
Number of generic 
entrants post patent 
expiry and their effect 
Increases Effect on generic price and generic penetration is 
ambiguous 
Savings to health 




No evidence exists at systemic level; available 
evidence pertains only to ad hoc estimation of 
individual policy measures 
Source: Kavanos et al. 2008. Competition in off-patent drug markets: Issues, regulation and evidence. 
Economic Policy. vol. 23, no. 55  
Marketing Strategies 
Originator pharmaceutical companies are continuously trying to minimize the increasing 
market share of generic drugs. A 2009 European Commission of Inquiry into the 
pharmaceutical sector indicated that while factors such as regulatory framework play an 
important role in obstacles to generic market entry, it established that the behaviour of 
originator companies has a profound impact on market entry. It describes the ‘tool-box’ of 
armaments that originator companies use in response to generic entry.  The European 
Commission lists the following 'instruments and measures’ that are used by originators 
(European Commission 2009, p. 16): 
 “patenting activities, 
 contacts, disputes and litigations between originator and generic companies, 
 opposition procedures and appeals before patent offices, 
 patent settlements and other agreements between originator and generic companies, 
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 interventions of originator companies before national authorities deciding on marketing 
authorisation, pricing and reimbursement of generic products, 
 promotional activities, and 
 second generation products.” 
In addition originators may also develop, launch and market patent-protected therapeutic 
alternatives (Simoens et al. 2005, Galizzi, Ghislandi & Miraldo 2011). 
The European Commission, in its Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Final Report, defines second 
generation products, also referred to as ‘follow-up’ products, as “products that result from 
follow-up R&D essentially based on that of an existing product ("first product") and have 
essentially a similar mode of action. These second products may have the same INN 
(International Non-proprietary Name) as the first product (e.g. second products involving 
inter alia new formulations, crystalline forms, particle sizes or medical uses) or a different one 
(e.g. combinations, individual stereoisomers separated from mixtures or the identification of 
metabolites of an existing INN).” (European Commission 2009, p.351) Industry frequently 
refers to these as ‘me-too’ or incremental innovation drugs.  
In addition to the launch of ‘me-too’ and other on-patent innovative products, an increasing 
trend seen in many countries, including South Africa is the launch of ‘authorised generics’ 
(AGs), also referred to as ‘clones’ or ‘auto-generics’. AGs, as defined in a report by the Federal 
Trade Commission are “pharmaceutical products that are approved as brand-name drugs but 
marketed as generic drugs.” (Federal Trade Commission 2011, p. 3).  They have alternative 
names to their generic brand-name counterparts and are manufactured either by the 
originator company or by another pharmaceutical manufacturer through acquisition or joint 
venture. They are frequently launched prior to the originator’s patent expiry.  This is based 
on the concept of the ‘first-mover advantage’ in which the first generic launched is able to 
gain substantial market share at a higher price than that of later generics. As the quality of 
the AG is perceived to be higher than that of later entrants, first entrant prices can be 
maintained at a higher level and products may retain market share for a longer period of time 
(López-Casasnovas, Puig-Junoy 2000). 
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The implementation of ‘pay-for-delay settlement’ is another strategy to minimise the impact 
on originator drugs. In this agreement a brand-name company pays a generic manufacturer 
to delay their launch of a generic together with the promise not to launch an AG. This is 
particularly prevalent in the US where the first generic filed gets a 180-day exclusivity period 
when no other generic may launch. AGs are not subject to this exclusivity (Federal Trade 
Commission 2011). 
The response to the launch of a first-time generic often favours originator products and the 
perception of generics is frequently negative. This is as a result of a combination of factors 
including: 
 imperfect information regarding the quality of generics due to a poor understanding of
the regulatory requirements for the registration of generic medicines;
 brand loyalty to originators and risk aversion based on provider and patient experience
gained during the on-patent period (López-Casasnovas, Puig-Junoy 2000);
 the launch of originator ‘me-too’ products in competition with generics combined with
strong sales and marketing force of originator products (Galizzi, Ghislandi & Miraldo
2011).
 the lack of incentive to move to generics (López-Casasnovas, Puig-Junoy 2000).
South African pharmaceutical policies that impact generics 
In South Africa medicines are highly regulated, affecting market structure and competition. 
Policies that impact the entry and penetration of generics into the market are detailed below. 
 Drug registration: All scheduled medicine must be registered by South Africa’s Medicine
Controls Council (MCC) prior to marketing the product in South Africa. The MCC
determines the scheduling status of medicines and approves products on the basis of
efficacy and quality of the production facility. Pharmacoeconomic evaluation information
for new chemical entity medicines and for new indications for existing medicines is
currently required on a voluntary basis. Any ‘interchangeable multi-source medicine’
(generic) must prove bioequivalence to the originator to get registration approval.
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Registration processes are notoriously slow, although there is an accelerated review 
process to fast track the registration process for specific medicines that have important 
therapeutic benefit and which are required urgently to deal with key health problems. 
The turnaround times for registration of generic medication is reported to be faster than 
that of innovative products (Crasto 2014).   
 Draft changes to Intellectual Property regulations were published in September 2013.  A 
change in the Patent Act to incorporate ‘patent flexibilities’ as contained in the TRIPS 
Agreement is proposed to ensure that the Act is amenable to issues related to access to 
public health. ‘Patent flexibilities’ include compulsory licensing, which allows a third party 
to produce the patented product or process without the consent of the patent owner 
(Department of Trade and Industry 2013).  
 Price regulation: In the past decade several regulatory interventions and policies have 
been implemented in an effort to control medicine prices. The Department of Health 
(DoH) has indicated that the aim of the regulatory interventions is to “Protect the South 
African health system from paying distorted prices for medicines through the elimination 
of price distortions and price distorting behaviour” (Department of Health 2010a). Pricing 
regulation and related policies are as follows: 
o Single Exit Price (SEP) was introduced in 2004. This requires that manufacturers or 
importers of medicines sell scheduled medicine at the same price to all purchasers 
with the exception of the State. Manufacturers were required to submit their initial 
SEPs based on a calculation adjusted for discounts previously given and taking into 
account the price of the product in other countries where medicine prices were 
regulated. The SEP includes the logistics fee which may be negotiated between the 
manufacturer and logistics providers/distributors. SEP increases are only allowed on 
an annual basis. The quantum of the increase is guided by a published formula, but 
the final increase is determined annually by the Pricing Committee (Department of 
Health 2004a). Legislated SEP increases are detailed in Table 3; these are the 
maximum that a SEP may be increased. Of note is that a zero percent increase was 
applied in 2005, 2006 and 2011. SEP decreases, either temporary or permanent can 
be made at any time through application to the DoH. 
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o Rebates, discounts and other incentive schemes offered by manufacturers to 
providers have been prohibited since 2004 (Department of Health 2004b).  
 
   
Table 3: Legislated Single Exit Price increases 
Year Quantum of Increase 
2005 No increase 





2011 No increase 
2012 2.14% 
2013 5.8% 
Source: (Department of Health 2006, 2008a, 2008b, 2010b, 2011, 2013)  
 
o Dispensing fees were regulated in 2004, but were contested in court and only finally 
implemented in December 2010 for pharmacists. These are reviewed annually. The 
dispensing fees are based on a tiered structure and are considerably higher for more 
expensive drugs. Consequently this could result in a disincentive for a pharmacy to 
dispense cheaper products e.g. cheaper generics. Dispensing fee regulations and 
licensing restrictions are also in place for non-pharmacists such as doctors and 
nurses. 
o Draft regulations for the introduction and methodology of international benchmarking 
(external reference pricing) of originator medicine prices have been published (May 
2014) but not yet implemented. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Spain and South 
Africa as proposed as benchmark countries (Department of Health 2014). Regulation 
of logistic fees that manufacturers pay for the distribution of medicines has also been 
published but not finalised.   
o There are no specific pro-generic pricing or reimbursement policies. No national 
system of GRP is in place in South Africa. However in the private insurance industry 
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both GRP and therapeutic reference pricing (TRP) are applied, sometimes 
simultaneously. Whereas only some administrators and schemes TRP, mostly for 
chronic medication, GRP is frequently applied. In 1987 MediKredit Integrated 
Healthcare Solutions (“MediKredit”), a pharmacy benefit manager, implemented the 
first GRP model called “Maximum Medical Aid Price” (MMAP) (Author’s industry 
knowledge). This model soon became the industry norm. Subsequently multiple GRP 
models have been implemented by different medical scheme administrators and 
pharmacy benefit managers. Table 4 lists the names and custodians of some of the 
different models.  
Table 4: Generic reference pricing models in South Africa's private healthcare insurance market 
Reference Pricing Model Name Abbreviation Custodian 
Careware Average Price  CAP Liberty 
Maximum Medical Aid Price MMAP MediKredit Integrated Healthcare Solutions 
Medicine Price List MPL Medscheme Holdings 
Mediscor Reference Price MRP Mediscor 
Qualsa Maximum Price QMP Qualsa Healthcare  
(Metropolitan Health Group) 
Source: Based on author’s industry knowledge 
Each GRP model is based on a different methodology with varying frequencies of updates. 
Consequently the industry is subjected to multiple different GRP categories each with varying 
reference prices. Although most pharmacies and dispensing doctors use third party practice 
management software which typically updates the reference prices for the various GRP 
models, it is surmised that the full value of the GRP is undermined by the complexity of 
multiple models. As medicine is frequently reimbursed by a third party, prescribers are often 
less aware of the cost of prescribed medicine and available generic alternatives as well as the 
varying reimbursement limits of the different GRP models.  
 The only pro-generic demand side policy that is in place in South Africa at a national level 
is mandatory generic substitution which was implemented in 2003 (Deroukakis 2007). 
This legislation requires that pharmacists or other dispensers of medication are obliged 
to inform patients of the availability of ‘interchangeable multi-source medicine’ (generic) 
alternatives as a substitute for the branded medication prescribed by their doctor and 
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dispense a generic alternative, unless the doctor has specifically indicated that 
substitution should not take place, the patient declines a generic or the price of the 
generic is higher than that of the branded product. At the time the Medicines Control 
Council (MCC) maintained a list of products that were considered non-substitutable. This 
list has subsequently been withdrawn.  
 Other pro-generic policies in place are typically driven by private funders of health care 
in an effort to reduce medicine costs. These include the use of treatment protocols 
and/or formularies as well as the appointment of ‘designated service providers’ (DSPs) 
for the provision of specific services and regulations relating to the implementation of 
prescribed minimum benefits (PMBs). The PMBs are a set of benefits for which a medical 
scheme is obliged to pay in full, including the diagnosis, treatment and care costs. Generic 
prescribing and dispensing may be a pre-requisite for participation as a DSP for the supply 
of medicine. Manufacturers compete for inclusion on formularies and negotiations are 
complex as a manufacturer needs to take into account a wide variety of the formularies 
and reference pricing models, each with different member impact and implementation 
dates as well as the manufacturer’s DSP arrangements.  
 The South African private healthcare market is subject to multiple pharmaceutical pricing 
regulations as well as medical insurer PMB and DSP requirements. The complexity of 
these policies is enhanced by the fragmentation resulting from a multitude of different 
insurers that apply additional customized pharmaceutical policies.   
Reference pricing 
Definition 
Reference pricing may be external or internal. External reference pricing is a price control 
mechanism, whereas internal reference pricing is a method of reimbursement by setting a 
ceiling for health insurers. These are defined in more detail below. 
External reference pricing or international benchmarking is defined as “the practice of using 
the price(s) of a medicine in one or several countries in order to derive a benchmark or 
reference price for the purposes of setting or negotiating the price of the product in a given 
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country”. It is the most commonly used pricing policy in Europe, being used by 87% of 
European countries (Leopold et al. 2012). 
Internal reference pricing is a system of controlled reimbursement in which a maximum 
reimbursement price is set by a third party insurer for a defined group or cluster of medicines. 
The difference between this reference price and the price of the prescribed drug, if higher, is 
paid by the patient. This out-of-pocket (OOP) payment is often referred to as cost-sharing 
(Aaserud et al. 2006). Patients are made aware of drug prices and are made to bear some 
responsibility for higher cost drugs, thus transferring risk from the funder to the patient. 
Unlike fixed co-payments, patients can choose to avoid a co-payment as they have the option 
to switch to a lower-cost drug at or below the reference price (Aaserud et al. 2006, Miraldo 
2009, Moran 2010, Galizzi, Ghislandi & Miraldo 2011). However, the desired outcome is that 
the patient switches to a cheaper alternative, thus reducing the overall cost of the drug. 
Different terms used for reference pricing include maximum allowable costs, best available 
prices and minimum pricing (Aaserud et al. 2006). Reference pricing is sometimes referred to 
as “index pricing”, however with index pricing the pharmacist is incentivized to dispense the 
lowest cost drug in the index cluster as the pharmacist pockets the difference between the 
index price and the dispensed drug price (Aaserud et al. 2006, Brekke, Grasdal & Holmas 
2009). 
Although it is not strictly a pricing policy, reference pricing can have an impact on 
manufacturers’ pricing policies as the manufacturer has an incentive to price below the 
reference price (Dylst, Vulto & Simoens 2011). As such it may be referred to as an indirect 
method of price control (Aaserud et al. 2006). 
Internal reference Pricing Objectives 
The objective of reference pricing is to promote rational use of interchangeable drugs to 
control overall pharmaceutical expenditure with no associated negative health outcomes 
(López-Casasnovas, Puig-Junoy 2000, Golob, Molj & Podnar 2007) and no discriminatory 
effects (Miraldo 2009). The success of this objective depends on the effectiveness of reducing 
the demand for higher-priced products (demand-side approach) while simultaneously 
encouraging product price cuts, thereby stimulating price competition (supply-side approach) 
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( Puig-Junoy 2005, Brekke, Grasdal & Holmas 2009).  Management of demand is achieved by 
creating price-sensitivity and restraint in prescribers, dispensers and consumers of medicine 
by exerting financial pressures on consumers through cost-sharing of dispensed products 
priced above the reference price. Price competition is created by inducing pharmaceutical 
firms to reduce prices around the reference price to ensure that market share is not lost 
(López-Casasnovas, Puig-Junoy 2000, Aaserud et al. 2006). However, because of information 
asymmetry, moral hazard, provider incentives and heterogeneity that typify healthcare 
markets, demand for healthcare is frequently determined by providers. Consequently control 
of supply is often more effective than control of demand (Mossialos, Mrazek & Walley 2004). 
Types of internal reference pricing 
Three basic types of reference price clusters or drug groupings are typically described. The 
equivalence criteria of the cluster determine the type of reference pricing. These clusters are 
determined by chemical, pharmacological or therapeutic equivalence and are often referred 
to as different levels or phases of reference pricing (see Table 5). 









ATC level Comparability of cluster 
drugs 
















ATC level 4 e.g. 
C10AA: HMG CoA 
reductase inhibitors 
Chemically slightly different;  
similar pharmacological 









effect but not necessarily 
chemically or 
pharmacologically similar 
Source: Collated from Galizzi 2011; Aaserud et al. 2009 
In generic reference pricing (GRP) (Level 1 reference pricing), also referred to as molecular 
reference pricing, chemical equivalence criteria are applied. Included products typically have 
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the same active ingredient, strength and route of administration as an off-patent originator 
drug and are generally considered interchangeable (Aaserud et al. 2006, Galizzi, Ghislandi & 
Miraldo 2011). These clusters are within the same Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) 
level 5 group. Different salts and esters as well as comparable dosage forms e.g. tablet and 
capsule may be considered interchangeable. Products with different bioavailability across 
brands such as drugs with narrow therapeutic indices for which a change in preparation may 
result in toxic or sub-therapeutic doses may be regarded as exclusions to the criteria (Moran 
2010). Critical to the implementation of GRP is concise inclusion and exclusion 
interchangeability criteria. 
Level 2 therapeutic reference pricing (TRP) may include clusters of drugs that are chemically 
different but pharmacologically similar with similar molecular structure, similar 
pharmacological benefits and similar or identical indications. This typically includes products 
that are classified within the same level 4 ATC structure.  
Level 3 TRP is the broadest definition where clusters can be therapeutically similar and include 
all drugs to treat a specific condition (Aaserud et al. 2006, Galizzi, Ghislandi & Miraldo 2011). 
Included drugs, usually in the same ATC level 3 classification, are not necessarily similar 
biochemically or pharmacologically, but they have comparable therapeutic effects (Dylst, 
Vulto & Simoens 2011).  
Although each type of reference price has its own advantages, there are disadvantages at 
each level. GRP (level 1) may result in a prescription for a patented drug that is not subject to 
reference pricing in order to avoid a co-payment. Ultimately this will drive costs up further. 
Therapeutic reference pricing, on the other hand, may prompt the prescribing of a less 
appropriate drug with negative clinical consequences in order to avoid a co-payment (Dylst, 
Vulto & Simoens 2011).  
Practically reference pricing has been implemented in many shapes and forms. Policies and 
criteria that determine the impact of the RP include: 
 Level of reference pricing and equivalence criteria  
 Implementation of a combinations of reference pricing levels 
 Eligible therapeutic groups  
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 Methodology to determine the quantum of the reference price and frequency of review 
 Inclusion/exclusion of patented drugs 
 Incentives for prescribers and dispensers 
 Exceptions and exclusion policies 
 Type and level of co-payment 
 Pricing regulation policies, including internal regulation and external reference pricing 
(benchmarking) 
 Generic substitution policies e.g. forced substitution 
 Parallel importation policies (Puig-Junoy 2005). 
The flexibility of implementation of reference pricing is a benefit as it can be customized to 
specific requirements.  However this heterogeneity has its disadvantages in that it becomes 
increasingly challenging to determine the impact of the various policies, either alone or in 
combination.  
 Country analysis 
In this section I provide a high level overview of reference pricing systems that are currently 
in place across the globe to illustrate the variability that exists. The objective is not to provide 
a comprehensive analysis as this in itself would be a dissertation.  
Generic and therapeutic reference pricing is widely adopted across the globe however its 
implementation varies considerably. Table 6 illustrates this variability, highlighting the 
different levels of reference pricing, pricing methodology and regulations of various countries.  
Reference pricing, particularly GRP, is a common pharmaceutical policy in many countries. It 
was first implemented in the state of Maryland by US Medicaid. The first country to 
implement RP at a national level was Germany in 1989 (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) 2008).   
In a sample of 26 European countries, 73% apply some form of officially set reference pricing. 
The majority use chemical equivalence as the RP model, and several countries have varying 
combinations of TRP and GRP. 54% of this sample of countries also applies price regulation 
policies on generic medicines (Puig-Junoy 2010).  
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GRP was implemented in Sweden (1993) and Norway (2003) but has subsequently been 
withdrawn in both countries. Sweden now applies compulsory substitution with the lowest 
priced generic GRP (Puig-Junoy 2010).  British Columbia, Canada first introduced GRP in 1994 
but subsequently moved to TRP.  
Table 6 illustrates reference pricing models of various high income countries. As previously 
indicated there is very little information available on LMICs, and where this is available it is 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The impact of GRP 
The effectiveness of reference pricing depends on the policy’s ability to modify both supply and 
demand. How effectively does it promote dynamic price competition and does it encourage 
financial responsibility of consumers, prescribers, dispensers and pharmaceutical companies 
(Galizzi, Ghislandi & Miraldo 2011)? The success of reference pricing on these interventions is 
influenced by multiple factors, some of which are described below: 
 The socio-political, funding and legal context, including existing pharmaceutical and
healthcare policies such as legislation that enables clearly defined medication
interchangeability. These all impact the reimbursement status of medication both before
and after implementation of RP.
 The policy design of the reference pricing model plays a major role in its effectiveness.
Influencing factors include the equivalence criteria that determine the make-up of a cluster;
the inclusion or exclusion of branded products (in the case of TRP) and/or products that may
be deemed non-substitutable; the price of the base product(s); the number of products in a
cluster; the methodology used in the price calculation and the frequency of RP price reviews
(Galizzi, Ghislandi & Miraldo 2011).
 The extent to which stakeholders are involved from an early stage as well as the roll-out of
a comprehensive patient communication strategy to ensure acceptance and understanding
(Moran 2010).
 Patients’ price-sensitivity linked to the quantum of co-payment and patients’ willingness to
pay OOP together with their perception of the substitutability of generics.
 Prescribing and dispensing provider characteristics: perception of the substitutability of
branded product with generics as well as incentives and/or disincentives to substitute. Puig-
Junoy reports that  in several countries pharmaceutical companies offer large discounts to
pharmacies (from 10-70%) but that these discounts are seldom passed on to the consumer.
The percentage discount often correlates to the number of generic competitors in the
market (Puig-Junoy 2010, 2012). In South Africa discounting and rebates are prohibited
however prescribing and dispensing may be influenced by specific manufacturers either
through managed care formularies or manufacturer-linked marketing incentives.
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 Pharmaceutical market characteristics that may impact RP effectiveness include the quality 
of generics, the number of generic firms, the number of generic products per category 
(Galizzi, Ghislandi & Miraldo 2011) and negotiations and arrangements with funders and 
providers.  
In reality measuring the impact of GRP is a complex challenge because of heterogeneous nature 
of its implementation. There is also a paucity of long-term data (Golob, Molj & Podnar 2007) 
across all markets with the end result that the jury is still out on the long-term effectiveness and 
clinical outcomes of GRP. The distinct lack of comparable data is particularly a concern in LMICs.  
GRP data identified from LMICs are described below.  
A study conducted in South Africa assessed the effect when Medscheme administrators 
introduced their own reference pricing system in 2002. Nearly one year later product prices were 
seen to increase but the increases were lower when compared to inflation at the time (Rothberg 
et al. 2004).  
In Taiwan GRP with small OOP payments was implemented in their NHI system. Chen et al 
studied the impact of reference pricing on three cardiovascular drugs. The impact was a 5.8-
14.8% decrease in the daily cost of these medicine classes. However drug volumes and the 
overall expenditure on these drug groups increased significantly (Chen, Chen & Yang 2008).  
In Kyrgyzstan the impact of generic reference pricing was a decrease in product prices, resulting 
in more stable prices of medicines (Faden et al. 2011).  
The following section provides an overview of the potential impact of reference pricing, with a 
specific focus on GRP.  
Effect on Product Price 
Although reference pricing models are reimbursement systems rather than pricing systems, they 
are expected to have an impact on drug price. Theoretical studies predict that with the 
implementation of RP: 
 drugs that are priced higher than the reference price will decrease in price as pharmaceutical 
companies are incentivized to price their drugs at or below the reference price in an effort 
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to retain or increase market share. The quantum of this decrease depends on the design of 
the RP model, the number of drugs in a cluster, consumer price sensitivity and consumer 
perception of the substitutability of generics for brand-name drugs (Brekke, Holmas & 
Straume 2011, Galizzi, Ghislandi & Miraldo 2011).  
 drugs priced below the reference price may increase in price as the RP may be viewed as a 
target (Dylst, Vulto & Simoens 2011). This is consistent with Danzon and Ketcham (2004)’s 
theory of ‘price convergence’ towards the reference price.  
 An increase in price may be anticipated in those drugs that have non-referenced therapeutic 
alternatives, referred to as ‘unintended cross-price effects’ by Brekke (Brekke, Grasdal & 
Holmas 2007, 2009, Brekke, Holmas & Straume 2011, Dylst, Vulto & Simoens 2011).  
Analyses of 22 empirical studies in OECD countries (GRP and TRP studies) by Galizzi et al. (2011), 
23 studies of European countries by Dylst et al. (2011) and 12 studies by Puig-Junoy (2010) largely 
support these theoretical predictions. The studies illustrate a generalized decrease in product 
prices in the majority of countries with GRP policies, irrespective of the country’s regulatory 
environment. The impact of GRP on reducing price is however generally much smaller than that 
of TRP models (Galizzi, Ghislandi & Miraldo 2011). The price decrease often occurs rapidly after 
GRP implementation, evidenced by data from Germany, Italy, Sweden and Norway (Puig-Junoy, 
Moreno-Torres 2010, Dylst, Vulto & Simoens 2011). Kavanos et al. report a decline of up to 47% 
in the lowest generic price, but indicate that if there is no incentive to rapidly decrease prices 
below RP, average generic prices decrease sluggishly  over time (between -1.4% to -2.7%) 
(Kanavos, Costa-Font & Seeley 2008).  In Norway RP was introduced in 1993, but was stopped in 
2001 due to insufficient long-term cost saving (Dylst, Vulto & Simoens 2011). More significant 
price reductions were observed for those drug categories which had generics available before 
implementation of RP (Galizzi, Ghislandi & Miraldo 2011). In addition, price decreases have been 
positively correlated with the number of generic categories (Puig-Junoy, Moreno-Torres 2010).  
GRP is seen to have similar effects when implemented in LMICs. In South Africa, the 
implementation of GRP for a privately insured population resulted in retarding the inflation rate 
of impacted medicines – the price of more than 50% of formulary drugs either decreased or did 
not increase after 1 year (Rothberg et al. 2004). In Kyrgyzstan reference pricing was also seen to 
decrease and stabilize medicine prices (Faden et al. 2011). 
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The decrease in price is however noted to be asymmetrical within a reference category – the 
analyses described above demonstrated that products priced above the reference price, in 
particular original branded products, tended to decrease in price whereas frequently products 
at or below the reference price remained unchanged, indicating an absence of price competition 
below the RP (Puig-Junoy 2010, Galizzi, Ghislandi & Miraldo 2011).  This however is contrary to 
the theory termed the ‘generic paradox’, expounded by Scherer, which suggests that the price 
of originator drugs increases with the introduction of RP due to prescriber brand loyalty (López-
Casasnovas, Puig-Junoy 2000).  Slovenian and Hungarian studies partially support this theory as 
the price of several original products did not decrease with the launch of generic products and 
the implementation of reference pricing (Golob, Molj & Podnar 2007, Dylst, Vulto & Simoens 
2011). Similarly a study of six European countries suggested that RP had a positive effect on 
originator drugs (von der Schulenburg, Vandoros & Kanavos 2011). The asymmetry of price 
impact is also seen in products that have prices below the RP - in the Netherlands it was observed 
that some drugs raised their price to the level of the reference price (Dylst, Vulto & Simoens 
2011), as predicted by theory.  
A study from Spain illustrates the saturation point of the impact of RP – once drug prices had 
fallen to the level of the RP, almost no products reduced their price until such time as the 
reference price was adjusted downwards (Puig-Junoy 2010, Dylst, Vulto & Simoens 2011). Galizzi 
et al also report on the positive impact of repeated and persistent reductions of the RP on 
product price (Galizzi, Ghislandi & Miraldo 2011).   
The impact of reference pricing cannot, however, be viewed in isolation as typically RP models 
are implemented in conjunction with a range of other price reducing strategies. A study by the 
European Commission (2009) showed that price reductions were greater when GRP is combined 
with mandatory generic substitution and when reference prices are regularly revised.  
It must be noted that while reference pricing and other pro-generic policies do encourage market 
entry of generics and reduce prices, data from countries such as the United Kingdom and United 
States which have no price regulations, suggest a more rapid decline in generic prices. Thus 
competitive forces may have a greater impact on prices compared to price regulation (Kanavos, 
Costa-Font & Seeley 2008, Simoens 2012).   
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Effect on Drug Utilisation and Market Share 
Theoretical modelling confirms that the introduction of RP increases the use of drugs which are 
included in the reference cluster, that are priced at or below the RP. This impacts the percentage 
share of the generic and brand-name markets (Miraldo 2009, Dylst, Vulto & Simoens 2011). 
However the impact of RP on drug use and market share is dependent on numerous factors, 
including but not limited to the time of introduction, the price response of the manufacturers of 
original drugs, frequency of updates, the method of calculation of the RP (Golob, Molj & Podnar 
2007, Puig-Junoy 2007) and marketing strategies of originator and generic medicines. For this 
reason there is a lack of clear-cut evidence on the true impact of GRP.  
If brand-name drugs do not adjust their price to RP levels, generic utilisation and consequent 
market share is seen to increase significantly, resulting in a wider price differential between 
generics and originators (Ghislandi, Krulichova & Garattini 2005, Aaserud et al. 2006, Golob, Molj 
& Podnar 2007, Galizzi, Ghislandi & Miraldo 2011). An example of this impact was the 
introduction of RP for Lisinopril in Belgium, where there were two originator products, Zestril® 
and Novatec®. Zestril®, which dropped its price to that if the generic, increased its market share 
by 15%, whereas Novatec®, which didn’t adjust its price, decreased in market share by 43% 
(Simoens et al. 2005).  Although generic utilisation in Belgium is comparatively low, the average 
generic market share was noted to increase from 2.05% of the total market in the 3.5 years 
preceding GRP implementation to 6.11% in the 3.5 years post-implementation. New generics 
launched showed an initial increase in market share which stabilised after a few months 
(Simoens et al. 2005). Generic drug use may however be hampered where ‘price convergence’ 
towards the reference price occurs, as generic products lose their price advantage over the 
originators (Puig-Junoy 2005, 2007). In Spain reference pricing appears to have discouraged 
generic entry. This was specifically noted when the Spanish reference pricing model was changed 
in 2004 to oblige pharmacists to substitute the lowest priced generic. This had the effect of 
forcing brand-name drugs to reduce their prices to the reference price level which discouraged 
generic price advantage (Moreno-Torres, Puig-Junoy & Borrell 2009). 
To counter the impact of RP, originator companies use a host of strategies to impact generic use 
and minimize generic market share. Several of these strategies were described under the section 
‘Marketing Strategies’ above.  
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Reference pricing may encourage a switch to patented products - GRP may lead to a reallocation 
of demand with patients moving from older, less expensive off-patent drugs to newer, more 
expensive on-patent products which do not attract GRP co-payments (Ghislandi, Krulichova & 
Garattini Dylst 2005, Vulto & Simoens 2011, Galizzi, Ghislandi & Miraldo 2011). This was 
observed in the Netherlands where patients moved to on-patent proton pump inhibitors (PPIs) 
such as esomeprazole instead of using generic omeprazole (Dylst, Vulto & Simoens 2011). 
However no analysis is available that determines whether this switching is due to GRP or other 
circumstances.  
Effect on Expenditure 
Empirical studies, including studies in Belgium, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Spain show a 
significant reduction (up to 50%) in expenditure on pharmaceuticals subject to GRP, particularly 
in the short-term (Ghislandi, Krulichova & Garattini 2005, Simoens et al. 2005 Puig-Junoy 2007, 
Galizzi, Ghislandi & Miraldo 2011). As an example, in Belgium the introduction of GRP in 2001 
lead to a savings of 7.3% from 2001 to 2002 in pharmaceutical expenditure where a generic was 
available.  The source of savings includes a decrease in the price paid by the funder due to the 
reference price cap; a decrease in the price paid by the consumer for reference medicines; a 
decrease in co-payment and increase in use of generics where patients opt to use products that 
are at or below the reference price; and lower costs of pharmacy stock (Moran 2010).  
However GRP may not lead to long-term savings in pharmaceuticals subject to GRP or in savings 
in total pharmaceutical expenditure (Chen, Chen & Yang 2008, Dylst, Vulto & Simoens 2011, 
Galizzi, Ghislandi & Miraldo 2011) for various reasons, including: 
 GRP by definition can only apply to the limited number of medicine categories for which 
generic products are available; 
 Changes in prescribing habits - over time there is a reallocation of demand to on-patent 
products which do not attract GRP co-payments; an increase in volume of dugs dispensed 
within a cluster, as reported by Chen et al. (2008).  
 RP only impacts price and not utilisation (Dylst, Vulto & Simoens 2011). 
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Impact on Out of Pocket (OOP) Payments 
Moral hazard refers to the insurance risk that arises when an insured party’s behaviour changes 
as a result of being insulated from risk. Typically utilisation and/or costs increase. In the case of 
pharmaceuticals, cost-sharing policies such as reference pricing OOP payments, flat-rate co-
payments, coinsurance, deductibles and differential co-payments  may be implemented to 
reduce this moral hazard as demand is frequently responsive to price and related cost-sharing 
(Austvoll‐Dahlgren et al. 2008).  
Several studies have shown a decrease in demand with the implementation of cost-sharing 
policies. An Italian study based on a natural experiment showed a 4% reduction in per capita 
volumes prescribed and a 3.4% reduction in public expenditure with a 1 Euro increase in a fixed 
co-payment. Similarly a 1 Euro reduction in co-payment resulted in an increase in per capita 
prescribed volumes and expenditure of 3.4% and 4.9% respectively (Fiorio, Siciliani 2010).  
The concern raised with GRP is that patient demand is frequently determined by providers. 
Because information asymmetry typifies healthcare, patients may inadvertently claim a more 
expensive alternative based on a doctor’s prescription or as determined by a pharmacists’ 
available stock. In addition equity in healthcare may be reduced as cost-shifting is directed to 
individuals who may not be able to cost-share (Mossialos, Mrazek & Walley 2004).  
Equity concerns are frequently raised as cost-sharing may not be voluntary on the part of the 
patient and low income patients may be forced to default on treatment due to the inability to 
pay OOP (Mossialos, Mrazek & Walley 2004). 
Impact on Health Outcomes 
Theoretical modelling by Brekke et al. (2011) suggests the possibility that both GRP and TRP may 
negatively impact health outcomes by inducing trade-offs between the co-payment and the 
potential health advantages. Brekke also postulates that RP may decrease research and 
development into innovative drugs which could ultimately have a positive impact on health 
outcomes. On the other hand their model also suggests that RP may reduce the price of ‘me-too’ 
drugs, which could then force pharmaceutical companies to invest in innovative drugs (Brekke, 
Holmas & Straume 2011, Galizzi, Ghislandi & Miraldo 2011) which ultimately may have a positive 
impact on health outcomes.   
B-33 
 
Most literature reviews and studies argue that because of the bio-equivalence requirements of 
GRP, it should not have a systematic effect on health outcomes (López-Casasnovas, Puig-Junoy 
2000). Dylst comments that there may be an impact on adherence if co-payments are onerous; 
however this is less of an issue with GRP where products are interchangeable (Dylst, Vulto & 
Simoens 2011). A survey in British Columbia indicated that 75% of physicians reported a 
deterioration of patient symptoms when moved to a bio-equivalent product (López-Casasnovas, 
Puig-Junoy 2000).  Unfortunately there is little evidence on the impact of RP on health.  Where 
studies are available these assess the impact of the more controversial TRP on health outcomes, 
which is not a focus of this literature review. Lopez-Casasnovas (2000), proposes that available 
studies cannot provide conclusive evidence firstly because of the paucity of time series studies 
at an individual patient level with adequate before and after time periods, and secondly because 
of the complexity of monitoring concurrent health system changes (Lopez-Casasnovas, 2000). 
Identification of gaps / Needs for further research 
The cost advantage of increased generic utilisation is undoubted. The European Commission, 
following publication of its final competition inquiry report encouraged its members to increase 
market entry and penetration of generics to improve price competition (Usher, Barry 2012).  
However, although there are multiple well-documented pro-generic policies, the appropriate 
mix of these policies to achieve maximum generic penetration and price competition is unclear. 
Concerns have been raised that generic reference pricing may have a mixed impact on drug price 
competition, utilisation patterns, health outcomes and innovative drug development, 
particularly over a longer time period. Until recently, there have been very few studies that focus 
on the impact of various pro-generic policies in particular there have been few studies that 
analyse the impact of different combinations of these policies. Although there has been an 
increase in published studies in the developed world over the past 10 years, many of these 
studies use aggregate level rather than individual case/patient-level data, due to the lack of 
accessibility to micro-data. In LMICs, however there are very few published studies of the 
empirical effect of reference pricing (López-Casasnovas, Puig-Junoy 2000).   
A major gap in research is studies of the impact of pro-generic policies, including reference 
pricing, in LMICs. This is supported by Kaplan who stated: “Evaluations of generic medicines 
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policies in LMICs are urgently needed” (Kaplan et al. 2012). However in developed nations, 
research gaps include non-aggregated data, preferably over longer time periods that can address 
the impact of various combinations of pro-generic policies, in an effort to identify the most 
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To determine the impact of generic reference pricing in a privately-insured healthcare setting in 
South Africa, a low and middle income country. Results were compared with international 
empirical data in an effort to draw policy conclusions on how to increase generic utilisation in 
this setting. 
Methods 
A time-series intervention study was conducted on retrospective records data to which generic 
medicine pricing had applied. The impact of reference pricing on drug price, expenditure, market 
share and out-of-pocket payments was determined for two categories, Clopidogrel and 
Desloratadine. Clopidogrel has an authorised generic.  
Results 
The overall medicine expenditure decreased across both categories. Generic prices decreased 
but originator prices were not impacted. The originators rapidly lost market share, declining to 
almost 4% for Clopidogrel and 22% for Desloratadine.  Clopidogrel’s authorised generic gained 
68% of the market despite being priced above the reference price and generating increasing co-
payments.  For Desloratadine generics gained greater market share (80%). Across both 
categories there was minimal change in overall expenditure on out-of-pocket payments. 
Conclusions 
The impact of generic reference pricing in this setting is mostly consistent with international 
literature. This study highlights the negative impact that brand loyalty and information 
asymmetry have on pro-generic policies, and how originator marketing strategies use these 
factors to their advantage. It supports the need to align incentives of stakeholders in the demand 





 The impact of generic reference pricing in this study is mostly consistent with literature 
 Authorised generics gained market dominance, despite above-reference prices and 
increasing out-of-pocket payments 
 Originator companies’ marketing strategies effectively reduce the impact of generics 










Pharmaceutical expenditure is responsible for a substantial percentage of the total cost of health 
care and increases in pharmaceutical expenditure continue to exceed economic growth and 
inflation (1). Generic medicines play an important role in limiting this expenditure, and 
consequently there is an international drive to increase their utilisation.  Intercontinental 
Marketing Services (IMS) estimated that between 19 and 40 billion US dollars could be saved 
worldwide through increased use of safe, low-cost generics (2).   
Multiple pro-generic policies have been implemented particularly in high income countries. 
These policies include demand and supply-side policies that aim to encourage generic entry and 
generic competition by influencing the reimbursement of medicines, the market price of 
medicines and/or the regulation of market authorisation (3). One such policy is generic medicine 
reference pricing (GRP). GRP sets a fixed maximum reimbursement amount for clusters of bio-
equivalent drugs, without placing any restrictions on the manufacturers’ price (1,4).  GRP has 
been implemented in many OECD countries, specifically in Europe (5).  
Expected profits, determined by patent protection policies, the extent of price regulation and 
price competition, are thought to impact the entry and penetration of a generic to a market (6,7). 
‘First mover advantages’ (which encourage the launch of generic drugs by allowing a market 
exclusivity period), non-transparent discounting, other demand-side incentives as well as 
originator drug marketing strategies (8) also impact generic market entry.  
Strategies used by originator companies to delay or minimize the increasing market share of 
generic drugs include ‘authorised generics’. ‘Authorised generics’ (AGs), also referred to as 
‘clones’, ‘auto-generics’ or ‘co-marketed copies’ are “pharmaceutical products that are approved 
as brand-name drugs but marketed as generic drugs” (9). They are manufactured either by the 
originator company or by another pharmaceutical manufacturer through acquisition or joint 
venture, and may be launched prior to the originator’s patent expiry.  This is based on the 
concept of the ‘first-mover advantage’ in which the first generic launched is able to gain 
substantial market share at a higher price than that of later generics. As the quality of the AG is 
perceived to be higher than that of later entrants, first entrant prices can be maintained at a 
higher level; the products may retain market share for a longer period of time (10). 
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In South Africa the registration and price of medicines is highly regulated, with few pro-generic 
policies in place to encourage market entry. Registration requires proof of bioequivalence of 
generic medicines. Although it is reported that the registration of generic products is faster than 
that of originator products (11), there is no specific policy for the fast-tracking of regulatory 
approval of generic medication, and first mover advantages are not applied. Registration does 
however apply the Bolar provision, a pro-generic regulatory policy which allows generic 
companies to complete regulatory requirements including bioequivalence studies before an 
originator’s patent has expired. A change in South Africa’s Patent Act was proposed in 2013 to 
incorporate the TRIPS Agreement ‘patent flexibilities’, including compulsory licensing, which 
allows a third party to produce the patented product or process without the consent of the 
patent owner (12). This regulatory change has however been highly contentious and has not yet 
been promulgated.  
Medicine prices have been regulated since 2004, with the implementation of the Single Exit Price 
(SEP) for scheduled medicines. The SEP includes the logistics fee which may be negotiated 
between the manufacturer and logistics providers/distributors.  Manufacturers or importers of 
medicines are obliged to sell scheduled medicine at the same price to all purchasers with the 
exception of government, where a tender system applies. There is, however, no regulation 
limiting generic prices relative to the originator price.  Simultaneously rebates, discounts and 
other incentive schemes offered by manufacturers were prohibited and dispensing fees were 
regulated, however the dispensing fees were legally contested and only implemented in 2010. 
Although the regulated maximum dispensing fee involves a higher percentage on lower cost 
items, the dispensing fee for lower cost items is less in absolute terms than that of higher cost 
items and thus the fee is unlikely to be pro-generic.   
There are no specific pro-generic pricing or reimbursement policies implemented at a national 
level, including GRP. The only national pro-generic demand side policy is mandatory generic 
substitution which requires patients to be informed of the availability of ‘interchangeable multi-
source medicine’ (generic) alternatives at the time of dispensing. However in the private 
insurance industry generic reference pricing systems are widely implemented. The first system, 
called the “Maximum Medical Aid Price” (MMAP), was implemented in 1987, and was the 
industry standard for many years.  Subsequently multiple different GRP models have been 
implemented by various administrators of medical insurance companies.  
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Numerous studies have been conducted internationally to analyse the impact of pro-generic 
policies, including GRP. However, what is not well established is the impact of GRP in low-to-
middle income countries (LMICs) (13,14), and whether it is comparable to the impact in high 
income countries. A review of published studies on the impact of pro-generic policy in LMICs by 
Kaplan et al. found only one study in a 10-year period (January 2000 to March 2010) that assesses 
the impact of generic reference pricing (14). This study reviews the impact of reference pricing 
on product prices and on expenditure but does not analyse the impact on utilisation, either at 
an aggregate or patient level (15).   
The objective of this article is to address this gap in research by analysing the impact of GRP on 
product price, expenditure, utilisation and out-of-pocket (OOP) payments in a sector of South 
Africa’s private health insurance industry, using robust claim level data. The results are analysed 
against the background of the existing medicine policies applicable to this sector, as these may 
have an impact on generic market entry and penetration.   
Methods 
Study design 
The study is a time series intervention study analyzing the impact of a GRP model using 
retrospective patient-level secondary data obtained through records review.       
Sampling strategy 
The ‘Maximum Medical Aid Price’ (MMAP) model is the GRP model that is evaluated. This model 
is applied to a sector of privately insured population in South Africa. Criteria for selection of GRP 
categories include categories with comparatively high volume of claims that were newly 
implemented between April 2008 and July 2009. Data prior to 2008 was not available. The time 
period was limited in order to maximize the post-implementation analysis period to at least 4 
years. Any category that was withdrawn either temporarily or permanently during this period 
was excluded.      
The sample population includes members of medical insurance companies that applied MMAP 
consistently over the analysis period, but did not apply other managed care policies that may act 
as a confounder, such as therapeutic reference pricing (TRP), formularies and benefit exclusions. 
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Insurers that had a membership variation greater than 20% over the study period were also 
excluded. 
Outcomes measured 
The impact of GRP on variables of drug price, drug expenditure, market share and out-of-pocket 
payment on drugs within the GRP cluster is measured.  
Data analysis 
A time-series analysis of the data is conducted.  The ‘periods’ of analysis are the time intervals 4 
months prior to the implementation of GRP (MMAP launch date), and the time intervals between 
subsequent GRP price changes. These time intervals vary substantially in duration because of the 
GRP price change dates are not consistent. In each case the impact of GRP is measured by 
analyzing changes in the originator, the AG (where applicable) and other generic drugs. All 
monetary figures are presented in nominal terms. Within each period the reference price 
remains fixed but the price of individual drugs within each cluster may change. 
The impact of the implementation of GRP on the price of products in that cluster is determined 
by comparing the product prices to the GRP for that period.   
Drug expenditure is analysed by comparing the expenditure per day and the expenditure per 
Defined Daily Dose (DDD) for that GRP category. DDD is defined as ‘the assumed average 
maintenance dose per day for a drug used for its main indication in adults’ (16). Drug expenditure 
is reported ‘per day’ to ensure a comparable denominator as the period intervals are not 
consistent. Expenditure per day is a function of price and utilisation, whereas expenditure per 
DDD takes into account the variation in product price, while controlling for volume changes. 
Market share by volume and value is analysed by comparing the percentage of DDDs and 
expenditure respectively. Out-of-pocket payment is assessed by determining the percentage of 
DDDs that generate an OOP payment (DDDs with OOP payment as a % of total DDDs), the 
percentage of total drug expenditure paid out-of-pocket (OOP expenditure as % Total 




Sample population and GRP categories 
A mean of 107,407 insured lives (SD = 1,194) from 4 different insurers met the inclusion criteria. 
All 4 insurers have restricted membership.  Many insurers were eliminated due to their 
application of benefit exclusions, drug formularies, membership variability and or therapeutic 
reference pricing, all of which act as confounders.  
Two GRP categories, Desloratadine and Clopidogrel, met the inclusion criteria.  Desloratadine, 
an antihistamine (ATC: R06AX27), is used to treat acute and chronic conditions, whereas 
Clopidogrel, a platelet aggregation inhibitor (ATC: B01AC04), is typically used on a chronic basis 
to prevent thrombosis. The period of analysis is 4.5 years (1635 days) for Clopidogrel and 5.2 
years (1891 days) for Desloratadine (See Table A in Online Appendix for further details). Over the 
study period there were 7 GRP price changes for Clopidogrel and 8 GRP price changes for 
Desloratadine following GRP implementation, occurring at varying intervals. These determine 
the analysis periods (See Table B in Online Appendix for further detail). An AG was launched for 
Clopidogrel but not for Desloratadine. Five generics were launched for Clopidogrel, four of which 
were launched within one year of the AG, and 4 for Desloratadine, launched over a period of 3 
years. 
Impact on price 
Originator: GRP had no impact on the originator price of either category – these products’ prices 
continued to increase in line with the legislated single exit price (SEP) increase (see Figure 1). 
When GRP was first implemented the originator price for Clopidogrel and Desloratadine was 63% 
and 34% (respectively) higher than GRP; at the end of the study period the originator was 268% 
and 86% (respectively) higher than GRP.  
Authorised Generic: Clopidogrel’s AG launched at a 30% reduction of the originator’s price. It 
reduced by a further 35% to match GRP once the 3rd generic was launched and thereafter it 
continued to increase by the allowed annual SEP increase, irrespective of any GRP changes. At 
the end of the study period the AG’s price was 69% higher than that of GRP. No AG was launched 
for Desloratadine.   
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Generics: For both Clopidogrel and Desloratadine GRP was implemented at the same price of 
the initial generics, shortly after their launch. Clopidogrel’s first generic launched 2 days after the 
AG and the second generic launched almost 3 weeks later. All new generics launched at a price 
lower or equal to the lowest-priced generic at the time. Changes in the GRP largely appear to 
follow the change in price of a generic in the cluster; however in most instances once the 
reference price is set other generics tend to align at or below the GRP. On some occasions an 
existing generic decreased its price in response to a new generic entrant’s lower price, despite 
being below the GRP. The GRP of Clopidogrel at the end of the study period was 5% more that 
the average price of all generics, with the lowest priced product 17% less than GRP and 344% 
less than the originator; the highest price product was 30% more than GRP and 185% less than 
the originator. For Desloratadine the GRP at the end of the study was the same as the average 
generic price and 82% lower than the originator price.  
It should be noted that for Clopidogrel the GRP increased substantially in the 6th time period 
after GRP implementation. This was due to a shortage of generic stock at the time, prompting 
the GRP to be set above the AG’s price so as not to negatively impact patients with OOP 
payments. 
 
1 a) Clopidogrel price changes (Nominal)  
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1 b) Desloratadine price changes (Nominal) 
Figure 1: Impact of GRP on prices of Clopidogrel and Desloratadine products over the study 
period 
Impact on expenditure, volumes and market share 
Clopidogrel 
The overall expenditure per day for the Clopidogrel category increased by 23% in the first period 
after GRP implementation, attributed to a 26% increase in DDDs/day and countered by a 3% 
decrease in expenditure/DDD (see Figure 2). Following this initial increase, overall expenditure 
per day and expenditure/DDD decreased over the remainder of the study period, while there 
were only small fluctuations in utilisation. From the pre-GRP implementation to the end of the 
study period the overall expenditure per day decreased by 40%, despite a 13% increase in the 
DDDs/day. The overall expenditure/DDD decreased by 47% over the same period.   
As indicated in Figure 2, following an initial 13% increase, the daily dispensed volume of the 
originator decreased substantially (by 96%) over the study period following the implementation 
of GRP, resulting in a similar decrease in expenditure per day. However the cost per DDD 
increased by 21%, mirroring the corresponding increase in the price of the originator. The market 
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share of the originator plummeted to 4% by volume and 9% by value over the corresponding 
period (see Figure A in Online Appendix). 
Clopidogrel’s AG increased dramatically in daily volumes dispensed (by 724%) and daily 
expenditure (555% increase) over the first four periods, capturing 61% and 64% of the market 
share by value and volume respectively. Over this time the cost per DDD decreased by 20%, in 
line with the 23% decrease in the AG’s price. However, from this point onwards the AG’s price 
started to increase and the dispensed volumes and expenditure stabilized. Despite this levelling 
off, the AG’s majority market share by volume was maintained, increasing slightly by expenditure 
in light of the increased product price. 
 
2a) Variation in expenditure per day (Nominal)  
 




2c) Variation in expenditure per DDD (Nominal)  
Figure 2: Impact of GRP on Clopidogrel products over the study period 
 
Similar to the AG, Clopidogrel’s generics increased dramatically in expenditure and dispensed 
volume in the two periods immediately after GRP implementation. However, when compared to 
the rapid increase (190%) in the utilisation of the AG over the next 2 periods, the increase in 
generics utilisation tailed off to 41% (see Figure 2). Although the generics gained a substantial 
increase in market share over the study period, capturing 25% of dispensed volumes in the first 
four periods following GRP implementation, they continuously trailed behind the AG’s market 
share. By the end of the study the generics held almost one third of the market by volume and 
almost a quarter of the market’s total value, whereas the AG held more than two thirds by value 
and 63% by volume (see Figure A in Online Appendix). 
Desloratadine 
GRP was implemented 12 weeks after the launch of the first Desloratadine generic. In this pre-
implementation period, very low generic volumes were dispensed. However, following the 
implementation of GRP the generic volumes and associated expenditure increased rapidly 
especially in the 4 periods (2.4 years) following implementation, with an overall increase of 
4297% and 4084% respectively (see Figure 3). The expenditure per DDD, however, decreased by 
13% over the study period, which correlates with the 13% reduction in average generic price. In 
contrast the originator’s daily volumes and expenditure decreased by 76% and 68% respectively 
over the study period, while its expenditure per DDD increased by 31%. The greatest impact was 
again in the 4 periods after GRP implementation. Across the Desloratadine category for the 
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duration of the study there was a 15% increase in daily volumes, a 10% decrease in daily 
expenditure and a 15% decrease in average expenditure per DDD following GRP implementation.  
The generic market share increased continuously over the study period to gain 77% of the 
volume dispensed and 63% of expenditure. The originator’s market share declined to 23% by 
volume and 36% by value (see Figure B in Online Appendix). 
 
3a) Variation in expenditure per day (Nominal) 
 




3c) Variation in expenditure per DDD (Nominal)  
Figure 3: Impact of GRP on Desloratadine products over the study period 
Impact on out-of-pocket payments 
Clopidogrel 
As indicated in Figure 4, when GRP was first implemented 96% of all dispensed Clopidogrel was 
subject to an OOP payment. Subsequent fluctuations in the GRP resulted in inconsistent changes 
in the volumes of Clopidogrel that attracted OOP payments, particularly when the GRP was 
adjusted above the AG price in the 6th period due to a shortage of generic supply. By the end of 
the study the volume of Clopidogrel with an OOP payment was approximately 89%.  The 
percentage of total drug expenditure that was paid out-of-pocket increased from 33% to 36% 
from the start to the end of the study. The OOP payment value per DDD, where applied, 
decreased by 34% over the corresponding period.  
The OOP payment trends for the AG are however opposite to that of the overall category. As a 
percentage of total the AG’s OOP expenditure and DDDs subject to a co-payment increased 
consistently across the study period. At the end of the study more than two-thirds of the market 
was willing-to-pay out-of-pocket for the AG, despite a dramatic increase in the quantum of the 
OOP payment (from 6% to 42% of the total drug cost) over the study period (see Figure 4a). 
Desloratadine 
The percentage of Desloratadine that was subject to an out-of-pocket payment reduced more 
dramatically than for Clopidogrel following implementation of GRP.  At the start of the study 70% 
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of Desloratadine was subject to a co-payment, but reduced to 42% at the end of the study.  There 
was a less pronounced decrease in the % of total expenditure that was paid out-of-pocket, as 
indicated in Figure 4. However, where an out-of-pocket payment was due, this was seen to 
increase in value by 31% from the start to end of the study period. The increase in the quantum 
of the OOP payment and the percentage of dispensed Desloratadine with an OOP payment as 
seen in the 8th period (P08) in Figure 4b, was due to the lowest cost generic increasing its price 
to the GRP level. 




4 b) Desloratadine  
Figure 4: Impact of GRP on out-of-pocket payments 
 
Discussion 
The overall effect of the GRP model studied supports available literature in that it is seen to have 
a striking initial impact on price, expenditure and market share. Substantial decreases in the 
originator’s market share and expenditure are contrasted by increases in generic market share 
and expenditure, with a nett effect of an increase in total volumes but decrease in expenditure. 
In keeping with other studies this impact stabilizes over the long-term (8,10,17-19). In this 
analysis the initial impact is seen over a period of 1.5 – 2.5 years, longer than the few months 
reported in another study (19), after which it appears to reach saturation point, with only 
minimal changes thereafter. Similar findings in Norway prompted the country to withdraw GRP 
8 years after implementation, citing that GRP resulted in insufficient long-term savings (17).  In 
this analysis, however, a transient increase in total expenditure and volume is seen in both RP 
categories following the initial implementation of GRP. This may be attributed to increased 
access to reduced-price generics and AG, not yet offset by the decrease in volumes of the 
originator. Several studies have shown a decrease in demand with the implementation of cost-
sharing policies. An Italian study based on a natural experiment showed a 4% reduction in per 
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capita volumes prescribed and a 3.4% reduction in public expenditure with a 1 Euro increase in 
a fixed co-payment. Similarly a 1 Euro reduction in co-payment resulted in an increase in per 
capita prescribed volumes and expenditure of 3.4% and 4.9% respectively (20). 
This study demonstrates a generalised decrease in the overall price of products within each 
cluster, also reported in other studies (8,10,18). However, pro-generic effectiveness appears to 
be limited for originator product prices. The findings of this study support the ‘generics paradox’ 
effect, as the originator price of both clusters is seen to be independent of generic competition 
(8,10,19,21), increasing by the permitted Single Exit Price increase, irrespective of the GRP 
changes. Factors that may influence originator companies’ approach to pricing of originators 
post generic entry include the introduction of auto-generics which may protect the firm’s market 
share, the concept of brand loyalty to the originator, with the expectation that the prescriber 
will continue to use the originator, and the risk of parallel importation of lower-priced originator 
drugs into markets.  This generic paradox is in contrast to theoretical studies and Galizzi and Puig-
Junoy’s findings that drugs above the GRP decrease to the RP level (18,22).  In addition, unlike 
Puig-Junoy’s findings (22), there isn’t conclusive data supporting the attribution of generic price 
decrease directly to GRP – the competition of lower-priced generics does impact existing generic 
prices. This may be due to the GRP pricing methodology, which considers the reliability of generic 
drug supply and as such does not necessarily use the lowest-priced generic as the reference 
price. Pricing regulation also has an impact as it appears to induce the ‘ratchet effect’ whereby 
some generics increase by the maximum permitted price increase to a level higher than would 
be expected without pricing regulation (8); however as interim price reductions are allowed in 
the South African SEP context, prices of some generics are reduced after taking the permitted 
increase in order to remain competitive.   
Of particular interest are the findings related to Clopidogrel’s AG, launched as a marketing 
strategy by the originator to minimise the impact of generic entry. Its market share by volume 
and value increased rapidly, stabilising higher than the market share of all the generics 
combined. Because the launch of the first generic was only 2 days after the AG’s launch, the AG’s 
market dominance is not thought to be due to a ‘first mover advantage’. This dominance is also 
surprising as the AG’s price is consistently higher than GRP and generic drug prices. This finding 
is not in keeping with the Federal Trade Commission’s analysis of AGs which found no evidence 
that the price of AGs was higher than the other generics (9). Use of the AG results in patient OOP 
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payments which increase as the price differential between the AG price and RP increases. GRP 
appears to have had no impact on this drug.  
This highlights the fact that there are other influencing factors at play and that the pro-generic 
effectiveness of GRP depends on its success at impacting demand-side measures in addition to 
the obvious supply-side measures.  Demand-side policies may be financial or non-financial and 
may be directed at prescribers, dispensers and/or patients (8).  
GRP does have a demand-side impact on patients through the application of OOP payments.  
However, the success of this intervention is linked to the patient’s willingness-to-pay and the 
degree of information asymmetry. In the case of Clopidogrel, GRP’s lack of impact is evidenced 
by the AG’s majority market share despite more than two-thirds of patients paying an increasing 
amount out-of-pocket for the AG.  It is not possible to determine whether this willingness-to-pay 
is as a result of price insensitivity (being privately insured patients) and/or due to other factors 
such as provider and dispenser resistance to switch to generics or managed care protocols 
limiting access to specific medication together with information asymmetry.  
Non-financial interventions that are associated with a positive impact on generic penetration 
include prescribing by International Non-proprietary Name (INN) (8,23), the use of computerized 
on-line price and prescribing/dispensing information, monitoring of prescribing behaviour (21) 
and audits (8). Prescribing by INN is attributed as a key driver in achieving an 83% generic 
utilisation rates in the United Kingdom in 2009/2010 (23).  
South Africa’s private healthcare sector is a complex and fragmented environment. There are 89 
medical insurance companies, and a myriad of different managed care companies and 
administrators (24). At least 5 different GRP models are in use, each with its own criteria for 
cluster inclusion, pricing methodology, frequency of updates and reference prices. In the case of 
the studied GRP model, category-specific member and pharmacy communication is distributed 
prior to RP implementation; however it can be concluded that this communication is insufficient 
to invoke a substantial switch to generics. This is not surprising as it is impossible for a prescriber 
or dispenser to be familiar with every model. Consequently the impact of each GRP model is 
minimised.  Systems that provide updated drug and reference price information and 
automatically apply reference pricing at the time of dispensing are available, but are mostly used 
by pharmacies and infrequently used by prescribers.  Although generic substitution by dispensers 
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is mandatory in South Africa, pharmacy switching to lower priced generics is limited by drug 
availability. Pharmacies typically do not procure all available generics, and may not have the 
lowest priced products in stock. Dispensing incentives from certain suppliers may also impact 
which generic is dispensed.  
 Limitations 
This study has several limitations that need to be considered. First, the sample population is 
small. Data is only available for a limited sector of the privately insured market, which insures 
approximately 8.76 million lives (24), and hence the results cannot be extrapolated to the entire 
private sector or to South Africa, a LMIC, as the majority of the population use public healthcare 
services (25). It is therefore limited in its representation of the impact of GRP in LMICs.  Of the 
available data a substantial portion was not eligible due to variation in membership and/or the 
insurer’s application of a host of managed care interventions which would act as confounders.  
Second, the period of analysis is relatively short, particularly the pre-GRP implementation period. 
This may not allow complete assessment of the market dynamics. Third, only two GRP categories 
were eligible for review. Although there were similarities in the observations across these two 
categories, these results cannot be transferred to the GRP model as a whole.  
Thirdly, DDDs have their limitations. DDDs are used for the measurement of drug utilisation and 
do not necessarily reflect the recommended or prescribed daily dose (PDDs). There may be 
significant differences between DDDs and PDDs (26).  
Fourthly, this study does not take into account the potential prescribing switch which may occur, 
often as a result of originator market strategies. Physicians may prescribe an incremental 
innovative drug (‘me-too drug’) or a true patent-protected therapeutic alternative.  
Finally, the study doesn’t include an assessment of the impact of potential switching to non-
referenced therapeutic alternatives. Any savings identified should take the expense on non-
referenced alternatives into account.  
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Conclusion 
The findings of this study are mostly consistent with literature published on the impact of GRP 
in high-income countries.  It corroborates the overall price and expenditure decrease that is seen 
in most GRP implementation studies as patients switch to cheaper alternatives to the originator. 
However, the study also powerfully demonstrates that there are many other factors at work and 
that GRP by itself may be an inadequate strategy.  In particular, the change in price, utilisation, 
expenditure and market share of Clopidogrel’s AG, compared to lower priced generics raises 
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Figure A: Change in the Clopidogrel market share in relation to GRP changes  
(a) Change in market share by cost 
 




Figure B: Change in Desloratadine market share in relation to GRP changes  
(a) Market share by value  
 





Table A: Identified GRP categories and related products 
















13 Sept 2008 – 3 May 
2013 














(Acute and chronic) 
5mg 
(1 tablet) 
Table B: ‘Period’ allocation and time intervals per generic reference price (GRP) category 
Clopidogrel bisulphate 75 mg Desloratadine 5 mg 
Period number Start date End date No. of days Start date End date No. of days 
P00 09/13/2008 01/12/2009 122 01/01/2008 04/27/2008 118 
P01 01/13/2009 02/14/2009 33 04/28/2008 04/05/2009 343 
P02 02/15/2009 06/30/2009 136 04/06/2009 09/30/2009 178 
P03 07/01/2009 05/13/2010 317 10/01/2009 05/13/2010 225 
P04 05/14/2010 12/31/2010 232 05/14/2010 09/30/2010 140 
P05 01/01/2011 02/05/2012 401 10/01/2010 10/31/2011 396 
P06 02/06/2012 08/31/2012 208 11/01/2011 03/05/2012 126 
P07 09/01/2012 03/05/2013 186 03/06/2012 10/31/2012 240 
P08 N/A N/A N/A 11/01/2012 03/05/2013 125 
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Healthcare financing in 
the context of the global 
emphasis on universal 
health coverage aims to 
prefund healthcare 
expenditure and protect 
against financial risk. In 
South Africa 
approximately 8.8 million 
people are covered by 
medical schemes 
(voluntary health 





















of healthcare insurance is to 
enable access to healthcare 
services and reduce out-of-
pocket (OOP) payments. 
However, South African 
medical scheme members 
fund more than 60% of the 
country’s total OOP 
HEU Policy Brief       [Date] 
Health Economics Unit – University of Cape Town 
What more can be done to 
promote the use of generic 
medicines? 
Key Points 
 Increased use of generic drugs can reduce expenditure on 
medicines and decrease the burden of out-of-pocket payments. 
 Generic reference pricing is a pro-generic policy that effectively 
reduces the overall expenditure and price of referenced drugs 
and increases generic utilisation. 
 ‘Authorised generics’ are launched by originator companies to 
reduce the impact of generic entry to market. They effectively 
reduce the impact of generic reference pricing by rapidly gaining 
market share. 
 Prescribing by the international non-proprietary name (INN), or 





payments6. A recent report 
from the Council for Medical 
Schemes indicates that a 
quarter of this sector’s OOP 
expenditure is attributable 
to medicine7.  
Increased use of generic 
medication reduces these 
OOP payments as well as 
reduces overall healthcare 
expenditure. Inter-
continental Marketing 
Services (IMS) has indicated 
that the global use of low-
cost generics could generate 
savings of 19 to 40 billion US 
dollars. However 
manufacturers of originator 
drugs try to protect their 
market share by limiting the 
entry and penetration of 
generics through a variety of 
marketing tactics. One such 
tactic is the launch of an 
‘authorised generic’ or 
                                                     
6 McIntyre, D., Doherty, J. & Ataguba, J. 
2012. Health care financing and 
‘clone’ (see Box 1 for a 
description).  
Many pro-generic strategies 
are available. These include 
measures that address both 
supply and demand. There is 
however no consensus as to 
which combination of pro-
generic strategies is most 
effective.  
Generic reference pricing 
(GRP) is a pro-generic 
system that largely impacts 
supply-side factors, but also 
has an impact on demand 
through the application of 
OOP payments (see Box 2).  
The impact of GRP in South 
Africa is not well 
researched. For this reason 
a study was conducted on a 
GRP system operational in 
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The objective of this study 
was to determine the 
impact of one of the GRP 
systems used in South 
African medical schemes. A 
time series intervention 
study was conducted on up 
to 5 years of unidentifiable 
patient level claims records 
for two identified 
categories of GRP, 
Clopidogrel, an anti-
thrombotic drug and 
Desloratadine, an 
antihistamine.  
7 Council for Medical Schemes, 2015. 
Out of Pocket Payments by Medical 
Scheme Members. 2 Feb 2015 
Box 1: What is an ‘authorised generic’ or 
‘clone’? 
This is a drug that is an exact copy of the originator  
 It is approved as a brand-name drug under patent 
protection but marketed as a generic   
 It is manufactured either by the originator 
company or in accordance with the originator 
company’s specifications 
 
Box 2: What is generic reference 
pricing (GRP)? 
GRP is a system of controlled 
reimbursement: 
 A maximum reimbursement 
price is set for a group of 
chemically equivalent, 
interchangeable medicines 
 The patient pays the difference 
between the reference price and 
the price of the prescribed or 
dispensed drug, if the dispensed 
drug price is higher 
 A co-payment can be avoided by 
D-4
The total study was divided 
into multiple ‘periods of 
analysis’. These are time 
intervals before GRP 
implementation and 
between subsequent GRP 
price changes. These time 
intervals vary substantially 
in duration because the 
GRP price change dates are 
not consistent. 
The impact of GRP on drug 
price, expenditure, market 
share and OOP payments 
was then reviewed. The 
changes in these 
parameters were tracked 
from pre-implementation 
of GRP to post-
implementation as well as 
across subsequent price 
changes of GRP.   In each 
case the impact on the 
originator drug, the 
generics and where 
applicable, the authorised 
generic was determined. 
Only the Clopidogrel 
reference category studied 
had an authorised generic. 
KEY FINDINGS 
Results that were common 
to both GRP categories were 
firstly that the overall 
expenditure on drugs in 
each category decreased, 
despite the volume of drugs 
dispensed increasing over 
the study period. Secondly it 
was established that GRP 
had no impact on the price 
of the originator product in 
both categories. The 
originator products 
continued to increase 
annually by the permitted 
single exit price (SEP) 
increase.  
For both categories the 
originator rapidly lost 
market share, however the 
extent of the decline 
differed. For Clopidogrel the 
originator’s market share 
(by volume) declined to 
almost 4% while 
Desloratadine’s originator 
declined to 22% (see Figures 
1 and 2).  
Clopidogrel’s authorised 
generic initially reduced in 
price to match the reference 
price, but then increased in 
line with the permitted 
single exit price increase, 
irrespective of any changes 
in the reference price. 
Nonetheless the authorised 
generic rapidly gained 
Figure 1: Change in Clopidogrel’s Market Share (by volume) in relation to reference 
price changes  
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market share, capturing and 
maintaining almost two 
thirds of the market despite 
an increasing quantum of 
co-payment applying. 
Clopidogrel’s generic drugs 
on the other hand only 
gained one third of the 
market despite their prices 
being lower than the 
authorised generic prices 
and co-payments being 
minimal.  
 
There was no notable 
change in Clopidogrel’s 
overall out-of-pocket 
expenditure. The 
percentage of drugs subject 
to an OOP payment only 
decreased marginally.   
 
Results for the 
Desloratadine reference 
category which did not have 
an authorised generic 
revealed a difference in the 
impact on market share 
movement. For 
Desloratadine the generic 
market share increased 
continuously, capturing 80% 
of the market by the end of 
the study (see figure 2). As 
with Clopidogrel there was 
little variation in total drug 
expenditure paid out-of-
pocket, but unlike 
Clopidogrel there was a 
dramatic decrease in the 
percentage of drugs 
dispensed that had a co-
payment 
 
WHAT DO THESE 
FINDINGS MEAN? 
 
The intention of generic 
reference pricing is to 
reduce the overall 
expenditure on medicines 
by encouraging patients to 
switch to using generic 
medicine, and in so doing 
minimising OOP payments 
while simultaneously 
encouraging product price 
cuts.  This empirical study 
supports the findings of 
international studies that 
indicate that GRP reduces 
overall expenditure by 
stimulating price 
competition. However this 
study also highlights the 
effectiveness of an 
originator manufacturer’s 
marketing strategy in 
launching an authorised 
generic.  
Figure 2: Change in Desloratadine’s Market Share (by volume) in relation to reference 
price changes  
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The strategy of an 
authorised generic plays on 
doctors’ and pharmacists’ 
brand loyalty as well as their 
quality perceptions of 
generics. The quality of the 
authorised generic is 
frequently perceived to be 
higher than that of other 
generics.  
This study suggests the issue 
of asymmetry in the 
relationship between a 
provider and patient, which 
may impact a patient’s price 
sensitivity. In this analysis 
patients appear to be 
willing-to-pay increasing co-
payments, despite the 
availability of generic 
alternatives with no or 
minimal co-payments. The 
study reinforces the 
importance of addressing 
                                                     
8 Dunne et al, 2013. A review 
of the differences and 
similarities between generic 
drugs and their originator 






Unfortunately the sample 
size of patients and number 
of GRP categories analysed 
was limited and was only 
representative of one of 
several GRP systems in 
South Africa’s private 
sector. Nevertheless the fact 
that several international 
empirical studies have 
shown similar results 
supports the findings and 






economic benefits associated 
with usage of generic 
medicines, using Ireland as a 
As the impact of originator 
manufacturers’ marketing 
strategies to hinder generic 
entry and penetration are 
seen to be highly effective, a 
major battle needs to be 
waged to counter these 
strategies. Medicines policy 
needs to focus on demand 
side measures.  
 
One policy that has been 
effective in promoting the 
utilisation of generic 
medicines is mandatory 
prescribing by the 
international non-
proprietary name (INN), or 
generic name. Prescribing by 
INN is attributed as a key 
driver in achieving 83% 
generic utilisation rates in 
the United Kingdom in 
2009/20108, one of the 
case study. BMC 
Pharmacology & Toxicology, 
vol. 14, pp. 1-1. 
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highest rates in the world.  
INN prescribing is listed as a 
recommended policy to 
reduce drug costs and 
expenditure in South 
Africa’s National Drug Policy 
of 1996. This policy, in 
combination with the 
current regulations 
enforcing mandatory 
generic substitution, as well 
as education on generic 
prescribing and generic 
acceptance should align 
prescribers and dispensers 
to improve generic 
utilisation and reduce OOP 
payments.  
 




 Enforce mandatory 
prescribing by INN in 
private and public 
sectors; 
 Emphasise education 
on generic prescribing 
in medical training; 
 Active promotion of 
























Appendix A: List of Data Fields required per GRP Category 
MMAP code 
Active ingredient name and strength 
Dosage form 
Category effective date 
Category termination date (if currently applicable) 
Temporary withdrawals? Y/N 
If Y, effective & termination date of withdrawal 
Price history (from 1 January 2007 – 31 July 2013): 
Effective date, price and associated pack size 
Effective date, price and associated pack size 
Effective date, price  and associated pack size etc. 
Defined Daily Dose (DDD) 
Appendix B: List of Data Fields Required for Claims from MediKredit 
Data fields to be requested for each claim line should include the following: 
Date of claim 
Product code (NAPPI code) 
Product name 
Product strength 
Product dosage form 
Product quantity dispensed 
Generic ingredient, dosage form & strength description 
Generic/original flag indicator 
Gross cost (including VAT, excluding dispensing fee) 
Nett cost (including VAT, excluding dispensing fee) 
Product SEP (including VAT) 
MMAP cost per unit (excluding dispensing fee) 
Calculated MMAP (based on dispensed quantity) 




Appendix C: List of Data Fields required for All Products mapping to 
Sample MMAP Categories 
Product Code (NAPPI code) 
Product Name 
Product dosage form 




SEP (including VAT) and associated pack size (repeat for all SEP updates from 1 January 2007 to 31 
July 2013) 
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circulat ion within their inst it ut ions. Perm ission of t he Publisher is required for resale or dist r ibut ion 
outside t he inst it ut ion a nd for all ot her de1i vative works, including compilat ions a nd translations 
(please consu lt http ://www.elsevier.com/ permissions). I f excerpts from ot her copyright ed works are 
included, the author(s) m ust obtain wr itten perm ission from the copyr ight owners and credit t he 
source(s) in t he article. Elsevier has prepr int ed forms for use by aut hors in these cases : please consult 
http ://www.elsevier.com/perm issions. 
For open access articles 
Upon accept ance of an artid e, aut hors will be asked t o complet e an 'Exclus ive License 
Agreement' (for more info1mat ion see http://www.elsevier.com/ 0Aauthoragreement). Perm itted 
reuse of open access articles is det erm ined by the aut hor 's choice of user l icense (see 
http ://www.elsevier.com/ openaccesslicenses). 
Retained author rights 
As an aut hor you (or your employer or inst itut ion ) retain ce1tain rights. For more info1mat ion on 
author 1i ghts for : 
Subscr ipt ion a rt ides ple.ase see 
http ://www.elsevier.com/journal-aut hors/author-r ights-a nd-responsibilities. 
Open access articles please see http ://www.el sevier.com/0Aaut horagreement. 
Role of the funding source 
You are request ed to identify who provided financial support for t he conduct of t he research a nd/ or 
preparation of t he a1t id e a nd to b1i efly descr ibe the role of t he sponsor(s), if any, in study design; in 
t he collect ion, analysis and int erpretat ion of d ata; in the wr it ing of t he report; and in t he decision t o 
subm it the a1t id e for publicat ion. If the funding source(s) had no such involvement t hen t his should 
be stated . 
Funding body agreements and policies 
Elsevier has established ag reements and developed policies to allow aut hors whose a rt icles appe.ar in 
journals published by Elsevier, t o comply w it h potent ial m anuscr ipt archiving requirements as specified 
as condit ions of t heir g rant awards. To le.am more about exist ing ag reements and po licies please v isit 
http ://www.elsevier.com/ fundingbodies. 
Open access 
This journal offers aut hors a choice in publishing t heir resea rch : 
Open access 
• A1t icles a re freely available t o both subsc1i bers and t he wider public with permitted reuse 
• An open access publication fee is payable by aut hors or t heir research funder 
Subscription 
• A1t id es a re made available t o subsc1i bers as well as developing count iies and pat ient g roups through 
our access programs (http ://www.elsevi er.com/ access) 




• No open access publicat ion fee 
All a1t icles published open access w ill be immediat ely and pe1manent ly free for everyone t o read 
and download. Permitted reuse is defined by your choice of one of t he following Cre.at ive Commons 
user licenses : 
Creative Commons Attr ibution-NonCommercia l -ShareA like (CC BY-NC-SA ) : for non-
commercial purposes, lets ot hers dist ribute and copy t he a1t icle, to create extracts, abstracts and 
other revised versions, adaptat ions or der ivative works of or from an article (such as a t ranslat ion), 
to include in a collective work (such as an anthology), t o text and dat a mine t he a1t icle, as long as 
t hey credit t he author(s), do not represent the author as endorsing t heir adaptation of the article, do 
not modify t he a1t icle in such a way as to damage the author 's honor or reput at ion, and license their 
new adapt at ions or cre.at ions under identical t e1ms (CC BY-NC-SA). 
Creative Com mons Attr ibution -NonComrnercia l-NoOerivs (CC BY-NC-ND) : for non-
commercial purposes, lets others dist ribute and copy t he a rt icle, and to include in a collective work 
(such as an anthology), as long as they credit the author(s) and provided t hey do not alt er or modify 
t he a1t icle. 
Elsevier has established agreement s w it h funding bodies, http ://www.elsevier.com/ fundingbodies. 
This ensures authors can comply wit h funding body open access requirements, including specific user 
licenses, such as CC BY. Some authors may also be reimbursed for associated publicat ion fees. If 
you need to comply w ith your funding body policy, you can apply for the CC BY license after your 
manuscr ipt is accepted for publicat ion. 
To provide open access, this j ournal has a publicat ion fee which needs to be met by t he authors or 
t heir research funders for e.ach article published open access. 
Your publ ication choice will have no effect on the peer review process or acceptance of submitted 
articles. 
The open access publicat ion f ee for this j ournal is $2,500, excluding taxes. Learn more about 
Elsevier's pricing policy: htt p ://www.elsevier.com/ openaocesspricing . 
Language (usage and editing services) 
Please writ e your t ext in good English (American or Br itish usage is accepted, but not a mi xture of 
t hese). Authors who feel or who a re info1med in t his regard by t he editors t hat their English language 
manuscr ipt may require editing to eliminate possible grammat ical or spelling errcrs and to conform 
to correct scien t ific Cng lis h moy w ish to use t he Cng lis h Lang ua ge Cd iting sci-vice o vo ilo ble fro m 
Elsevier's WebShop (http://webshop .elsevier.com/ languageediting/ ) or visit our cust omer suppo1t 
site (http://support.el sevier.com) for more information . 
Submission 
Submission t o t his journal proceeds totally online and you will be guided st epwise t hrough t he cre.at ion 
and uploading of your fil es. The system automat ically converts source fi les to a single PDF file of the 
article, which is used in the peer-review process. Please not e t hat even though manuscript source 
fi les are conve1ted to PDF files at submission for t he review process, t hese source fi les are needed for 
further processing after acceptance. All correspondence, including notification of t t-e Editor 's decision 
and requests for revisicn, t akes place by e-mail removing t he need for a paper t reil. 
Submit your article 
Please submit your article via http://ees.elsevier.com/ heap . 
PREPARATION 
Double-blind review 
This journal uses double-blind review, which me.ans t hat both t he reviewer and author name(s) 
are not allowed to be revealed to one another for a manusc1i pt under review. The identit ies of 
t he authors are concealed from the reviewers, and vice versa. For more information ple.ase refer 
to http ://www.elsevier.com/ reviewers/peer-review. To facilitate t his, please indude t he following 
separately : 
Title page {with authcr details) : This should include the t it le, authors' names and affiliations, 
and a complet e address for t he corresponding author including t elephone and e -mail address. 
Acknowledgements and t he Conflict of I nterest statement also need t o be included here. 
Blinded manuscript (noauthordetails}: The main body of t he paper ( including t he references, figures, 
tables s ho u ld not include a ny id en t ifying informot io n , s uch os t he o ut ho rs ' no m es o r offiliot ions. 
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Essential title page information 
• Title. Be concise and informat ive. Titles are often used in info1mat ion-ret1i eval systems. Avoid 
abbreviat i ons and formulae. 
• Author names and affiliations . Where t he family name may be ambiguous (e.g ., a double name), 
please ind icate t his clearly. Present the authors' affiliation addresses (where the actu al work was 
done) below the names. I ndicate all affiliations \Vit h a lower-case superscr ipt letter immediat ely after 
t he author's name and in front of t he appropr iate address. Provide t he full postal address of each 
affiliat ionr including the count ry name and, if available, t he e-mail address of each auth or. 
• Corresponding author. Clearly indicate who will handle correspondence at all s tages of refereeing 
and publication, also post -publicat ion. En sure that phon e numbers (w ith count iry an d a rea 
code) a re p rovided in add ition t o the e- m ail add ress and t h e comp lete pos1al address. 
Cont act d etai ls must b e kept up to date by t h e co rr espond ing author . 
• Present / permanent address. If an author has moved since t he work described in t h e a1t icle was 
done, or was visit ing at t he t ime, a 'Present address' (or 'Permanent address') may be indicated as 
a footnote to t hat author 's name. The address at which t he author actually d id t he work must be 
ret ained as t he main, affi liat ion address. Superscr ipt Arabic numerals are used for such footnotes. 
• Acknowledgements 
• C-onf/ict of Interest s tatement 
C.over fetter 
The cover letter is intended for t he ed it ors to assist t hem in t hei r assessment wheth er t he a rt icle 
fi ts t he scope of t he journal. Therefore, authors should repeat the info1mat ion given in t he abst ract 
and/or highlights but br iefly explain why they see Health Policy as the approp1i ate j ournal; this is 
even more impo1tant if t he fit wit h the journal's scope and objectives is not immediat ely obvious. The 
authors sh ould also po int to important considerations t hat t he editor should know when assigning the 
manuscr ipt or sending it for review. For example, authors who have d iscussed their manuscr ipt with an 
edit or prio r to submission should indicate this in t he cover letter. Previous publicat ion as an abst ract, 
academic t hesis or discussion paper should also be stated, and t he appropriat e sources g iven. 
Abstract 
An abst ract of 200 words (and not more t han 220) must be induded in the submitted manusc1i pt. 
As t he abst ract is often viewed separately from ithe article, it must be able to stand alone. It should 
state br ief ly and clear ly the purpose and sett ing , t he pr incipal findings and major conclusions, and 
t he paper·s cont r ibut ion t o knowledge. If applicab le, the count1y/count ries/locations should be cle.arly 
stated, as should t he methods and nature of t he sample, t he dat es, and a summary of t he findings/ 
conclusion . Please note t hat excessive statist ical det ails should be avoided, abbreviations/acronyms 
used only if essent ial or firmly est ablished, and t he abstract should not contain references to other 
published work. 
Graphical abstract 
Alt hough a g raphical abst ract is optional, it s use is encouraged as it draws more attent ion t o t he online 
article. The graphical abst ract should summarize t he contents of t he article in a concise, pictor ial form 
designed ito capture the attent ion of a w ide readership. Graphical abstracts should be submitted as a 
separate fi le in t he online submission system. I mage size : Ple.ase provide an image w it h a minimum 
of 53 1 x 1328 pixels (h x w) or propo,t ionally more. The image should be readable at: a size of 5 x 
13 cm using a regular screen resolut ion of 96 dpi . Prefe1Ted file typ es: TIFF, EPS, PDF or MS Office 
fi les. See http ://www.elsevier.com/ graphicalabst racts for examples. 
Authors can make use of Elsevier 's Illust rat ion and Enhancement se1v ice to ens!ure t he best 
present at i on of t heir images and in accordance w ith all technical requirements: Illustra tion Service. 
Highlights 
Highlights are mandatory for this j ournal. They consist of a sho,t collection of bullet po ints t hat 
convey the core findings of t he article and sh ould be submitted in a separat e fi le in t he online 
submissi~n system. Please use 'Highlights' in the file name and inelude 3 to 5 bullet poin ts (maximum 
12 words per bullet point , ple.ase write in complet e sentences, avoid using abbrev iat ions). See 
http://www.elsevier.com/highlights for examples. 
Classification and kevwords 
Authors a re asked to classify t heir submission us.ing t he provided classificat ion system. T hey are also 
asked to include 3 to 6 keywords, pref erably from the Medical Subj ect Headings from I ndex Medicus. 
Artwork 




Electronic Artwork (Figures) 
General points 
• Make sure you use uniform let ter ing and sizing of your or iginal a rt work. 
• Embed t he used fonts if t he applicat ion provides t hat option . 
• Aim to use the following fonts in your illust rat ions: A1i a l, Courier, Times New Roman, Symbol, or 
use fonts that look sim ilar. 
• Nu mber t he illust rat ions aoc:ord ing t o t heir sequence in the t ext. 
• Use a log ical naming convent ion for your artwork files. 
• Provide captions to illust rat ions separately. 
• Size the illust rat ions d ose t o t he desired d imensions of t he pr inted version . 
• Submit each i llustration as a separat e file . 
A d eta iled g uide on e lectronic a1twork is ava ilable on our website : 
http://www.elsevier.com/ artworkinst ructions 
You ar e u rged t o v isit this si te; some ex ce rp ts from the d et a iled inf o rm ation ar e g iv en h ere . 
Formats 
If your elect ronic a rt work is created in a Microsoft Office applicat ion (Word, PowerPoint, Excel) then 
please supply 'as is ' in the native document fo1m at . 
Regardless of the applrcat ion used other t han Microsoft Office, when your elect ronic a rtwork is 
finalized, please 'Save as' or convert t he images to one of t he following formats (note the resolut ion 
requirements for line d rawings, halftones, and line/halftone combinat ions given below): 
EPS (or PDF): Vector drawings, embed all used font s. 
TIFF (or JPEG) : Color or grayscale phot og raphs (halftones), keep t o a m inimum of 300 dpi. 
TIFF (or JPEG) : Bitmapped (pure black & whit e pixels) line drawings, keep to a minimum of 1000 dpi. 
TIFF (or JPEG): Combinat ions bitmapped line/ half-t one (color or g rayscale), keep to a m inimum of 
500 dpi . 
Please do n ot : 
• s upply files t hat are opt im ized for screen use (e .g ., GIF, 6M P, PI CT, WPG); these typ ically have a 
low number of pixels and limited set of colors; 
• Supply fi les that are too low in resolut ion ; 
• Submit g raphics that are dispropo1t ionately large for t he cont ent . 
C:0/or artwork 
Please make sure t hat art work files are in an acceptable format (TIFF (or JPEG), EPS (or PDF), or 
MS Office files) and w it , t he co1Tect resolut ion . I f, t og et her w it h your accept ed article, you su bmit 
usable color figures t hen Elsevier wi ll ensure, at no addit ional charg e, t hat these figures w ill appear in 
color on the Web (e.g ., ScienceDirect and ot her s it es) regard less of whether or not t hese illustrations 
are reproduced in color in the pr int ed version . Fo r co lor rep rod uction in p rint, you w ill receive 
inform ation regard ing t h e costs f rom Elsev ie r after rece ipt of you r accepted article. Please 
indicat e your preference for color : in p1int or on t he Web only. For f u1t her information on t he 
preparation of electronic a1twork, please see http://www.elsevier.com/ a1twork instructions. 
Please note : Because of technical complications t hat can arise by conve1t ing color figures to 'gray 
scale' ( for t he p1inted version should you not opt for color in pr int) ple.ase submit in addit ion usable 
black and whit e versions of all t he color illust rat ions. 
Illustration services 
Elsevier's WebShop (h:tp://webshop.elsevier.com/ illust rationse1v ices) offers Illust rat ion Services 
to aut hors prepar ing to submit a manuscr ipt but concerned about t he quality of t he images 
a ccom pa ny ing thc ir a ,t id c . Cb ev ie r's e xpe rt illus trat o rs can p rod uce scie nt ific, technical a nd med ical-
st yle images, as w ell as a full range of charts, t ables and graphs. I mage 'polishing' is also available, 
where our illus trators tcke your image(s) and improve t hem to a prof essional standard . Ple.ase visit 
t he website to find out more. 
Figure caption s 
Ensure t hat each illustration has a caption . Supply captions separately, not attcched to t he figure . A 
caption should comprise a b1i ef tit le ( not on t he figure itself) and a d esc1i ption of the illust rat ion . Keep 
text in the illust rations themselves t o a m inimum but explain all symbols and a:ibreviat ions used , 
Tables 
Number tables consecutively in aoc:ord ance w it h their appearance in the text. Place foot not es to t ables 
below t he table body and indicate them w it h superscr ipt lowercase letters. Avoid ve1t ical rules. Be 
spa1ing in t he use of tables and ensure t hat t he dat a presented in tables do not duplicat e resu lt s 
described elsewhere in the a rt icle . 




Throughout t he manuscr ipt text , Authors must indicate where approximately t he figures and t ables 
should be included . 
References 
Citation in text 
Please ensure t hat eve,y reference cited in the text is also present in t he ref erence list (and vice 
versa). Any references cited in the abst ract must be given in full . Unpublished results and personal 
communicat ions are not recommended in the reference list , but may be ment ioned in t he text . I f t hese 
references are included in the reference list they should follow t he st andard reference st yle of t he 
j ournal and should include a subst itut ion of t he publicat ion date wit h eit her 'Unpublished results' or 
'Personal communicat ion'. Cit at ion of a reference as 'in press' implies t hat t he it em has been accepted 
for publicat ion. 
Reference finks 
l ncre.ased dis-coverability of research and high quality peer review are ensured by online links t o 
t he sources cited . I n order t o allow us to ere.at e links to abst racting and indexing se1v ices, such as 
Scopus, CrossRef and PubMed, please ensure t hat data provided in the ref erences are conect. Please 
note t hat inco1Tect surnames, journal/book tit les, publication year and paginat ion may prevent link 
creation . When copying references, please be careful as t hey may already contain e1Tors. Use of the 
001 is encouraged, 
Web references 
As a minimum, t he full URL should be given and t he date when the reference was last accessed. Any 
further informat ion, if known (DOI , author names, dat es, reference to a source publicat ion, etc.), 
should also be given . Web references can be listed separat ely (e .g ., after t he ref erence list ) under a 
different heading if desired, or can be included in the reference list . 
References in a special issue 
Please ensure that t he words 'this issue' are added t o any references in t he list (and any citations in 
t he text ) t o other a1t icles in t he same Special Issue. 
Reference formatting 
There a re no st r ict requirements on ref erence formatting at submission. References can be in any 
st yle or fo1mat as long as t he style is consistent. Where applicable, author(s) name(s), j ournal 
t it le/ book t it le, chapter tit le/ article t it le, year of publicat ion, volume number/ book chapter and t he 
paginat ion must be present . Use of DOI is highly encouraged. The reference style used by t he j ournal 
is VANCOUVER NUMBERED and w ill be applied to the accepted article by Elsevier at t he proof stage. 
Note t hat missing data w ill be highlight ed at proof stage for t he author to co1Tect. If you do w ish t o 
format t he references yourself they should be a1Tanged according to t he following examples: 
Reference style 
Text : I ndicate ref erences by number(s) in square brackets in line wit h t he t ext. The actual authors 
can be refe1Ted to, but t he reference number(s) must always be g iven. 
List : Number the references (numbers in square brackets) in the lis t in t he order in which t hey appear 
in the text. 
Examples: 
Reference to a journal publicat ion : 
[1 ] Van der Geer J, Hanraads JAJ, Lupton RA. The art of writ ing a scientific article . J Sci Commun 
2010;163:51 - 9 . 
Reference to a book : 
[2] Saltman RB, Busse R, Figueras J, ed it ors. Social healt h insurance systems in western Europe. 
Berkshire : Open University Press; 2004. 
Reference to a chapter in an edit ed book: 
[3] McGlynn E. Measwing clinical quality and appropr iateness. I n : Smit h P, Mossialos E, Papanicolas 
I , Leatherman S, editors. Pe1f ormance me.asurement for health system improvement experiences, 
chal- lenges and prospects. Camb1i dge: cambridge University Press; 2009, p. 87- 113. Reference t o 
an electronic source: 
[4] I nternational Monet ary Fund. Greece: st and-by arrangement - Review under t he emergency 
financing mechanism. Count ry report no. 10/217. Washington, DC: IMF; 2010. Available at : http:// 
www.imf.org/ ext ernal/ pubs/ ft/scr/20 l 0/cr l 0217. pdf [ aocessed 10.08.13] . 




Note sho1t ened form for last page number. e .g ., 5 1- 9, and t hat for more t han 6 authors the first 
6 should be listed followed by 'et al .' For fu1t her details you are referred t o 'Uniform Requirement s 
for Manusc1i pts submitted to Biomedical Journals' (J Am Med Assoc 1997;277:927- 34 ) (see also 
http://www.nlm.nih.go'l/ bsd/uniform_requirements.html). 
Video data 
Elsevier accepts video material and animation sequences t o support and enhance your scient ific 
rese.arch . Authors who have video or animat ion files that they wish t o submit w ith t heir a1t icle are 
st rongly encouraged to indude links t o these w it hin t he body of t he a rt icle. This can be done in t he 
som e: vvoy o ~ o fiy ut c: u l o lJlc: lJy I c:fc:11i11y l o L1 1c: v iLlc:o 0 1 0 11i1110 Liv 11 1,;v11Lc:11l 0 11t.l 11v l i11y in Llic: LJv Ll y 
text where it should be placed. All submitted files should be proper ly labeled so t hat t hey direct ly 
relate to t he video fi le's cont ent . I n order to ensure t hat your video or animat ion mat e1i al is direct ly 
usable, please provide t he files in one of our recommended file fo1mat s wit h a preferred maximum 
size of SO MB. Video and animat ion files supplied will be published online in t he electronic version 
of your a rt icle in Else'/ier Web products, including ScienceDirect: http://www.sciencedirect.com. 
Please supply 'st ills ' with your fil es : you can choose any frame from the video or animation or 
make a separate image. These w ill be used inst ead of st andard icons and w II personalize the 
link to your video data. For more det ailed instructions ple.ase visit our video instruction pages at 
http ://www.elsevier.com/ artworkinst ructions. Note : since video and animat ion cannot be embedded 
in t he pr int version of the j ournal, please provide text for both t he electronic and t he pr int version 
for t he portions of t he art icle t hat refer to t his cont ent . 
AudioS/ides 
The journal encourages authors to create an AudioSlides presentation wit h t heir published a rt icle. 
AudioSlides are brief, webinar-style presentations t hat a re shown next t o t he online article on 
ScienceOirect. This g ives authors the oppo1t unity t o summarize t heir research in t heir own words and 
to help readers understand what t he paper is about . More information and examples a re available at 
http ://www.elsevier.com/ audioslides. Authors of this journal will automat ically receive an invit at ion 
e-mail to create an AudioSlides present at ion after acceptance of their pape1: 
Supplementary material 
Elsevier accepts electrcnic supplementary mat e1i al to suppor t and enhance your scient ific research. 
Supplement ary fi les offer the author additional possibilities to publish supporting applications, high-
resolution images, background datasets, sound clips and more. Supplementary fi les supplied will be 
oublished online alono!ide the electronic version of vour a1t id e in Elsevier Web oroducts. includina 
ScienceOirect: http ://www.sciencedirect.com . I n order to ensure t hat your submitted mat e1i al is 
directly usable, please provide the data in one of our recommended file formats. Authors should 
submit t he mater ial in elect ronic format together w it h t he article and supply a concise and desc1i ptive 
caption for e.ach file. For more detailed instructions please visit our artwork inst ruction pages at 
http://www.elsevier.com/ artworkinst ructions. 
Submission checklist 
The following list will be useful during t he final checking of an a1t id e p1ior to sending it t o t he j ournal 
for review. Please consult this Guide for Authors for furt her details of any item. 
En sur e t h at t h e f ollowing it ems are p resen t : 
One author has been designat ed as t he con esponding author w it h contact det ails: 
• E-mail address 
• Full post al address 
• Phone numbers 
All necessa1y files have been uploaded, and contain : 
• Keywords 
• All figure captions 
• All t ables ( including t itle, desc1i ption, footnot es) 
Fu1t her considerat ions 
• Manusc1i pt has been 'spell-checked' and 'g rammar-checked' 
• References are in t he correct fo1mat for this j oumal 
• All references mentioned in t he Reference list are cited in t he text , and vice versa 
• Permission has been obtained for use of copyr ighted mater ial from other sources (including the Web) 
• Color figures are clearly marked as being int ended for color reproduction on t he Web ( free of charge) 
and in pr int, or to be reproduced in color on t he Web (free of charge) and in black-and -white in p1int 
• If only color on the Web is required, black-and -white versions of t he figures are also suppl ied for 
pr inting purposes 




For any further information ple.ase visit our customer suppo1t site at http ://support.elsevier.com. 
Revised version of the manuscr ipt 
On the basis of the comments of t he referees and editors, Authors may be asked to revise their 
manuscr ipt . I n order to facilitate t he evaluat ion of t he revisions by t he referees and edit ors, upon 
revision, Authors are asked: 
• to indicate all changes to t he original manuscript by means of 't rack changes' 
• to add a letter for t he referees, explaining how t hey de.alt with all of the recommendat ions and 
questions from t he referees. 
Authors should submit t heir revised version no lat er t han 2 months after t hey were informed about 
t he decision t hat the manuscr ipt needs revision . I f no revised manuscr ipt is received 2 months after 
t he decision, t he manusc1i pt w ill be considered as rejected. If a second ( or third) revision is necessary, 
t he time is usually 1 month for re -submission . 
AFTER ACCEPTANCE 
Use of the Digital Object Identifier 
The Digital Obj ect Identifier (00 1) may be used to cite and link t o electronic documents. The DOI 
consists of a unique alpha-numeric character st r ing which is assigned t o a document by t he publisher 
upon t he init ial elect ronic publicat ion . The assigned DOI never changes. Therefore, it is an ideal 
medium for citing a document, pa1t icular ly 'A1t icles in press' because t hey have not yet received their 
full bibliog raphic info1mat ion. Example of a co1Tectly given DOI ( in URL format; here an article in the 
j ournal Health Policy) : 
http :// dx .doi .org/1 O .1 O 16/j.healthpol.2010.09 .oo 
When you use a DOI to create links to documents on t he web, the DOis are guaranteed never t o 
change. 
Online proof correction 
Co1Tesponding authors w ill receive an e -mail w it h a link t o our online proofing syst em, allowing 
annot at ion and correction of proofs online. The envi ronment is similar t o MS Word: in addit ion t o 
edit ing text , you can also comment on figures/ t ables and answer quest ions from t he Copy Ed it o1: 
Web-based proofing provides a faster and less e1Tor-prone process by allowing you t o directly type 
your corrections, eliminating t he pot ent ial int roduction of errors. 
If preferred, you can still choose to annotate and upload your edits on t he POF version. All inst ructions 
for proofing w ill be g iven in the e-mail we send t o authors, including alternat ive methods to t he online 
version and POF. 
We will do eve1ything possible t o get your article published quickly and accurately - ple.ase upload 
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